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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page61 of 113

Similarly, in Bridges v. U.S., 346 U.S. 209 (1953), the Court applied a
categorical approach to the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA),
which provided, in pertinent part, that “[w]hen the United States is at war the
running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense ... involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States ... shall be suspended....” Act of June
25, 1948, c. 546, 62 Stat. 828 (emphasis added) (codified in its present version at
18 U.S.C. § 3287). The Government charged Bridges with willfully making a false
statement, to wit, denying membership in the Communist Party, in connection with
his 1945 naturalization application. Invoking the WSLA, the Government argued
that the charges were timely. But the Supreme Court, recalling Noveck and
Scharton, held that the WSLA was “limited strictly to offenses in which defrauding
or attempting to defraud the United States is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged.” Id. at 221 (emphasis added).

In this case, the court made no attempt to distinguish Scharton or Noveck.
And though it purported to distinguish Bridges, it blatantly mischaracterized the
Supreme Court’s opinion, asserting that Bridges applied a categorical approach “in
large part” because of the WSLA’s legislative history. A149. The District Court’s
statement was wrong. Bridges’ passing reference to legislative history concerned a
different issue: whether the kind of “fraud” contemplated by the WSLA had to be
fraud “of a pecuniary nature.” 346 U.S. at 216. But the Court then stated, as an

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