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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 36 of 66
material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the judge
who must decide whether to excuse a juror for cause." (citing Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (giving general definition of materiality))).
B. Had Juror No. 50 answered Questions 25 and 48 truthfully, his answers
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
The second question is whether truthful responses from Juror No. 50 would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303. "[T]he test
is not whether the true facts would compel the Court to remove a juror for cause, but
rather whether a truthful response 'would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause.'" Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556).
"An impartial jury is one in which every juror is 'capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before [him]." Id. (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554).
"Jurors are instructed that they are to decide the question of a defendant's guilt based
solely on the evidence presented." Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616-
17 n.10 (2d Cir. 1997). A juror is biased-i.e., not impartial-if his experiences "would
'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath.'" Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)
(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); see also United States v. Torres, 128
F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (juror who structured financial transactions properly excused
for cause in case involving structuring of cash deposits).
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