HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011800.jpg
2.2 MB
Extraction Summary
7
People
3
Organizations
3
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book manuscript / memoir page (evidence exhibit)
File Size:
2.2 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by context and the header '/ BARAK / 43'). It details his inner circle and negotiating team, noting they were mostly military veterans of the 1967 and 1973 wars. The text reflects on the psychological impact of those wars on Israeli leadership and discusses the diplomatic stalemate with Syrian President Assad regarding the Golan Heights in late 1999. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
People (7)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Author / Narrator (Implied) |
Narrating his experience as Prime Minister/Military leader, discussing his negotiating team and philosophy.
|
| Uri Saguy | Negotiating Team Member |
Former head of military intelligence.
|
| Gilad Sher | Negotiating Team Member |
Gifted lawyer, former company commander in author's armored brigade.
|
| Amnon Lipkin | Negotiating Team Member |
Paratroop commander at Chinese Farm, author's successor as ramatkal (Chief of General Staff).
|
| Shlomo Ben-Ami | Negotiating Team Member / Politician |
Historian, diplomat, ran against author for Labor leadership.
|
| Danny | Associate |
Person to whom the author remarked about the purpose of Zionism (likely Danny Yatom).
|
| Hafez al-Assad | President of Syria |
Holding firm on negotiations regarding the Golan Heights in 1999.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Labor Party |
Mentioned as 'Labor leadership'.
|
|
| IDF (Israel Defense Forces) |
Implied through references to 'sayeret', 'armored brigade', 'ramatkal', 'military intelligence'.
|
|
| Israeli Intelligence Services |
Providing reports to the author.
|
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Military battle site where Amnon Lipkin commanded.
|
|
|
Country involved in peace negotiations.
|
|
|
Territory demanded by President Assad.
|
Relationships (3)
Known for a quarter century, Sher was a commander in Barak's brigade.
Lipkin was Barak's successor as ramatkal.
Ben-Ami ran against Barak for Labor leadership.
Key Quotes (3)
"we were all members of the 'generation of 1967 and 1973.'"Source
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Quote #1
"Zionism: to establish a state where Jews would no longer be victims of events, but would take control of their destiny and try to shape them."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011800.jpg
Quote #2
"President Assad was holding firm on his insistence that without our 'deposit,' without a prior agreement that he’d get back the Golan, there could be no substantive progress."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011800.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,410 characters)
/ BARAK / 43
sayeret deputy, my chief of staff. The negotiating team also included Uri Saguy,
former head of military intelligence; Gilad Sher, a gifted lawyer I’d known for a
quarter of a century and who had been a company commander in my armored
brigade in the 1970s; and Amnon Lipkin, the paratroop commander at Chinese
Farm and my successor as ramatkal when I left the army. Also, Shlomo Ben-Ami,
the Moroccan-born, Oxford-educated historian and diplomat who had run against
me for the Labor leadership. Shlomo had a gift for systematic analysis and keen
judgement, especially on security issues, which I highly valued.
former head of military intelligence; Gilad Sher, a gifted lawyer I’d known for a
quarter of a century and who had been a company commander in my armored
brigade in the 1970s; and Amnon Lipkin, the paratroop commander at Chinese
Farm and my successor as ramatkal when I left the army. Also, Shlomo Ben-Ami,
the Moroccan-born, Oxford-educated historian and diplomat who had run against
me for the Labor leadership. Shlomo had a gift for systematic analysis and keen
judgement, especially on security issues, which I highly valued.
It did not escape the attention of Israeli commentators, or other politicians, that
almost all of them were former soldiers whom I’d known from my time in uniform.
But that observation missed a more important point: we were all members of the
“generation of 1967 and 1973.” We had been soldiers during the Six-Day War. In
the years immediately after it, like almost all Israelis, we had allowed ourselves to
believe that our victory had been so comprehensive, and so quick, that any threat
from the defeated Arab states was gone for good. We assumed that inevitably,
inexorably, they would realize they needed to sue for peace, and that there was no
particular urgency on our part to do anything more than wait. Then, on Yom
Kippur 1973, all of that had been turned on its head. We had not only learned the
lessons, of 1973. We had internalized them. Even had we not known of the danger
of a new Palestinian campaign of terror, the option of simply watching and waiting
– and assuming that our military strength, which was now even greater, could
make events around us stand still – would not have made sense to us. Besides, as I
remarked to Danny and others, to do so would run against the founding purpose of
Zionism: to establish a state where Jews would no longer be victims of events, but
would take control of their destiny and try to shape them.
almost all of them were former soldiers whom I’d known from my time in uniform.
But that observation missed a more important point: we were all members of the
“generation of 1967 and 1973.” We had been soldiers during the Six-Day War. In
the years immediately after it, like almost all Israelis, we had allowed ourselves to
believe that our victory had been so comprehensive, and so quick, that any threat
from the defeated Arab states was gone for good. We assumed that inevitably,
inexorably, they would realize they needed to sue for peace, and that there was no
particular urgency on our part to do anything more than wait. Then, on Yom
Kippur 1973, all of that had been turned on its head. We had not only learned the
lessons, of 1973. We had internalized them. Even had we not known of the danger
of a new Palestinian campaign of terror, the option of simply watching and waiting
– and assuming that our military strength, which was now even greater, could
make events around us stand still – would not have made sense to us. Besides, as I
remarked to Danny and others, to do so would run against the founding purpose of
Zionism: to establish a state where Jews would no longer be victims of events, but
would take control of their destiny and try to shape them.
* * *
Yet making peace, like making war, takes two. Much as I’d wanted to begin
with Syria, until well into the autumn of 1999 President Assad was holding firm on
his insistence that without our “deposit,” without a prior agreement that he’d get
back the Golan, there could be no substantive progress. This was particularly
frustrating because I was getting reports from our intelligence services, and
with Syria, until well into the autumn of 1999 President Assad was holding firm on
his insistence that without our “deposit,” without a prior agreement that he’d get
back the Golan, there could be no substantive progress. This was particularly
frustrating because I was getting reports from our intelligence services, and
329
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