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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012)

The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development

Consistent with bin Laden’s plan to adapt the infrastructure developed during the Afghan jihad to build a global terrorist movement, al-Qaeda relied on the network of charities and wealthy individual donors established for the Afghan jihad to sustain its growth and development.16 According to the United Nations Security Council Committee Concerning al-Qaeda and the Taliban:

From its inception al-Qaida has relied heavily on charities and donations from its sympathizers to finance its activities. Charities provide al-Qaida with a very useful international channel for soliciting, collecting, transferring and distributing the funds it needs for indoctrination, recruitment, training, and *29 logistical and operational support. These funds are often merged with and hidden among funds used for other legitimate humanitarian or social programs. Al-Qaida supporters and financiers have also established front charity networks whose main purpose is to raise and deliver funds to al-Qaida. The roots of these charity networks stem from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the late 1980s. During that time, al-Qaida could draw on a number of state-assisted charities and other deep pocket donors that supported the anti-Soviet cause.17

As confirmed by internal al-Qaeda historical records seized during a 2002 raid of an al-Qaeda front charity, the partnerships forged during the Afghan jihad with the Muslim World League, International Islamic Relief Organization, and Saudi Red Crescent Society were among those seamlessly adapted to build and sustain the global infrastructure needed to support the planned jihad against the United States.18 Additional “charities,” such as al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Muwafaq Foundation, and the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, would emerge as important al-Qaeda partners as bin Laden’s organization grew and expanded its global terrorist and military operations to regions as diverse *30 as the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kashmir, Somalia, Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia.19

Plaintiffs’ pleadings and other record materials describe in detail the pervasive involvement of these purported charities in knowingly and directly supporting al-Qaeda in the years preceding the September 11th Attacks.20 As detailed in the record, the nature of the support provided by these organizations to al-Qaeda has taken many forms, and viewed collectively reflects their intimate, systematic, and longstanding ties to al-Qaeda. In this regard, plaintiffs’ pleadings and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that these purported charities have: (1) raised and laundered funds on behalf of al-Qaeda; (2) channeled donated funds to al-Qaeda; (3) provided financial and logistical support and physical assets to al- *31 Qaeda; (4) permitted al-Qaeda members to use ostensible employment with their organizations as a vehicle for covertly traveling in furtherance of al-Qaeda’s operations; (5) performed reconnaissance within conflict regions on behalf of al-Qaeda; (6) served as liaisons to localized terrorist organizations on behalf of al-Qaeda, thereby assisting al-Qaeda in expanding its operational base and sphere of influence; (7) funded and facilitated shipments of arms and supplies to al-Qaeda; (8) funded camps used by al-Qaeda to train soldiers and terrorists; (9) actively recruited Muslim youths on behalf of al-Qaeda; (10) served as channels for distributing information and documentation within al Qaeda, and from al-Qaeda to the media; (11) disseminated publications designed to advance al-Qaeda’s radical Islamist ideology throughout the Muslim world and legitimize violent jihad against Christians and Jews on the grounds that they are “infidels” who do not deserve to live; and (12) openly advocated for young Muslims to take up arms against Western and democratic societies.21

Contrary to the defendants’ tireless efforts to cast plaintiffs’ pleadings as conclusory, this Court commented in relation to a prior appeal in this *32 proceeding that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the terrorist activities of the purported charities “include a wealth of detail (conscientiously cited to published and unpublished sources) that, if true, reflect close working arrangements between ostensible charities and terrorist networks, including al Qaeda.” Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d at 76.

Defendants Aqeel al Aqeel, Soliman al Buthe, Abdullah Naseef, Abdullah bin Saleh al Obaid, Abdullah Muhsen al Turki, Adnan Basha, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Abdulrhaman al Swailem, Suleiman al Ali (the “Charity Official Defendants”), Yassin al Kadi, and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz served as senior officials of one or more of al-Qaeda’s front charities, and are alleged to have used their authority over those organizations to orchestrate their material support and sponsorship of al-Qaeda.22 Each of these defendants is specifically alleged to have acted with knowledge that the organizations under their control were channeling *33 material support and resources to al-Qaeda, and that the support flowing to al-Qaeda from the organizations under their control would be used to support al-Qaeda’s jihad against the United States.23 These allegations are corroborated by the very nature and scope of the support flowing from the charities under defendants’ control to al-Qaeda,

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