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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005)
10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789

Conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action liability: conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a tortious act ..., aiding and abetting requires that the defendant have given substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary wrongdoer.... In order to be liable for acting in concert with the primary tortfeasor under either theory, the defendant must know the wrongful nature of the primary actor’s conduct.

Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 122–23 (2d Cir.1998).
Accordingly, to survive these Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs must plead facts from which it reasonably can be inferred that the Defendants knew or should have known that their tortious actions were supporting terrorists or terrorist fronts. Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 800–01; see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir.2002) (“Boim II” ) (explaining elements of concerted-action civil liability under ATA); Virtual Countries, 300 F.3d at 241 (“Determining whether [Plaintiffs have demonstrated that one of the FSIA’s exceptions applies] involves a review of the allegations in the complaint, the undisputed facts, if any, placed before *555 the court by the parties, and—if the plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence to carry its burden of production on this issue—resolution of disputed issues of fact.”) (internal quotations omitted).

1. SHC
[10] Even if Plaintiffs alleged that SHC was tortiously liable for the attacks of September 11, such allegations could not overcome the discretionary function exception. SHC offers undisputed evidence that all decisions regarding the distribution of humanitarian relief funds were within the sole discretion of its Chairman Prince Salman and the advisors he selected. (See Al–Nafissa Decl. ¶ 8.) Further, SHC was guided by the Kingdom’s policies regarding Bosnia–Herzegovina in making its funding determinations. (Id. ¶ 3.) Accordingly, SHC’s alleged misuse of funds and/or inadequate record-keeping—even if it resulted in the funds going to terrorists—was the result of a discretionary function and cannot be the basis for overcoming SHC’s immunity. See U.S. v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense

(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984) (explaining FTCA discretionary function exception is designed to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of ... decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort”); Marchisella, 2004 WL 307248, at *2 (explaining the FSIA’s discretionary function exception replicates that found in the FTCA and that courts rely on the FTCA for guidance in interpreting the scope of the FSIA’s exception); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F.Supp. 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (explaining sovereign’s decisions regarding formation and enforcement of national policies are discretionary functions); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (stating torts exception is not applicable to claims based discretionary actions, even when that discretion is abused). Accordingly, the Court finds SHC is immune from suit in this litigation. Its motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for lack subject matter jurisdiction are granted.

2. Prince Salman and Prince Naif
[11] Similarly, even if Plaintiffs adequately plead a tort against Prince Salman and Prince Naif, the discretionary function exception prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction over them in their official capacities. Plaintiffs take issue with Prince Salman’s management of SHC and its funding decisions. Prince Salman’s direction of SHC, however, is discretionary. He was appointed President of SHC by King Fahd to carry out the Kingdom’s policy toward the refugees of the Bosnian war. (Al–Roshood Decl. ¶ 6; Al–Nafissa Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs claim that as Chairman of the General Donation Committee for Afghanistan he assisted the Afghanistan mujahideen in the 1980s. To the extent Prince Salman held this position as a member of the Saudi government, this was also a policy decision made at the operational level of government. Plaintiffs claim Yasser Arafat complained to Prince Salman as Governor of Riyadh regarding Saudi funding of extremists in Palestine. Plaintiffs do not allege, however, what relation that complaint has to the al Qaeda terrorists or this litigation. They argue that Prince Salman, who did not attend the meeting with the former French Minister of Interior, should have known from Saudi officials who did meet with him that unnamed terrorists were receiving funding from largely unidentified Saudi charities.4 See *556 Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 799. The Saudi attendees’ decisions concerning with whom the French Minister’s warnings should be shared and what the Saudi response would be, are surely grounded in social, economic, and political policy, and are, therefore, not

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