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Extraction Summary

5
People
1
Organizations
0
Locations
1
Events
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Relationships
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Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal document
File Size: 770 KB
Summary

This document is a page from a legal filing dated February 24, 2022, which analyzes legal precedent concerning juror bias, specifically from the case of McDonough. It presents quotes from concurring opinions by Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan, arguing that an intentionally false answer from a juror is not a necessary condition for a new trial and that juror bias can be inferred from circumstances. The document highlights the judicial reasoning that a trial court retains the option to hold a post-trial hearing to determine bias, regardless of a juror's honesty during voir dire.

People (5)

Name Role Context
Stevens Justice
Mentioned as one of the justices joining Justice Blackmun's writing.
O'Connor Justice
Mentioned as one of the justices joining Justice Blackmun's writing and cited for a concurring opinion in Smith v. Ph...
Blackmun Justice
Author of a concurring opinion in the McDonough case, which is quoted at length.
Brennan Justice
Joined Justice Marshall in an opinion and is quoted on the nature of juror bias.
Marshall Justice
Joined by Justice Brennan in an opinion recognizing issues with juror bias.

Organizations (1)

Name Type Context
DOJ Government agency
Appears in the footer identifier 'DOJ-OGR-00009034'.

Timeline (1 events)

The document discusses the concurring opinions from the legal case McDonough regarding juror honesty and bias.
Justice Stevens Justice O'Connor Justice Blackmun Justice Brennan Justice Marshall

Relationships (3)

Justice Stevens Professional Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's writing.
Justice O'Connor Professional Justice Blackmun
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's writing.
Justice Brennan Professional Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in an opinion.

Key Quotes (4)

"irrelevant” to the inquiry."
Source
— appeals' statement (Referring to the good faith of a potential juror.)
DOJ-OGR-00009034.jpg
Quote #1
"I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred."
Source
— Justice Blackmun (A quote from his concurring opinion in the McDonough case.)
DOJ-OGR-00009034.jpg
Quote #2
"the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.’"
Source
— Justice Brennan (From his opinion concurring in judgment in the McDonough case, quoting a majority opinion.)
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Quote #3
"must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances."
Source
— Justice Brennan (Explaining how juror bias must be determined.)
DOJ-OGR-00009034.jpg
Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,123 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 33 of 66
appeals’ statement that the good faith of a potential juror was “irrelevant” to the inquiry. Id. at 553-56.
There were two concurring opinions in McDonough, joined by a total of five justices, which make clear that an intentionally false answer is not a prerequisite to obtaining a new trial. Writing for himself and Justices Stevens and O’Connor, Justice Blackmun said:
I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring (emphasis added)). This was the entirety of Justice Blackmun’s dissent. Id.
For his part, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall recognized that “the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.’” Id. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting majority opinion).
“Necessarily,” then, Justice Brennan explained, bias “must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. “Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or
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