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627 KB
Extraction Summary
1
People
4
Organizations
0
Locations
3
Events
1
Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
627 KB
Summary
This page from a legal document outlines the legal standard for retroactivity as established in the Supreme Court case Landgraf v. USI Film Products. It then introduces an argument from a claimant named Maxwell, who alleges that the District Court incorrectly applied a 2003 amendment to Section 3283 retroactively to her convictions on Counts Three, Four, and Six, which involved conduct predating the amendment.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Maxwell | Claimant/Appellant |
Mentioned as the person claiming the District Court erred by retroactively applying an amendment to her convictions.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Court | government agency |
Cited as setting forth the two-part framework for retroactivity in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.
|
| Congress | government agency |
Mentioned in the context of prescribing whether a statute applies retroactively.
|
| District Court | government agency |
Mentioned as the court that Maxwell claims erred by applying an amendment retroactively.
|
| USI Film Products | company |
Named as a party in the case Landgraf v. USI Film Products.
|
Timeline (3 events)
1994
The Supreme Court case Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, which set a framework for determining retroactivity of statutes.
Relationships (1)
Maxwell is a claimant arguing that the District Court erred in its application of the law to her case.
Key Quotes (5)
"if Congress has expressly prescribed that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent conduct, the inquiry ends and the court enforces the statute as it is written, save for constitutional concerns."Source
— Weingarten (citing Landgraf)
(Describing the first step of the two-part framework for determining retroactivity.)
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Quote #1
"statute is ambiguous or contains no express command regarding retroactivity,"Source
— Weingarten (citing Landgraf)
(The condition that triggers the second step of the retroactivity analysis.)
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Quote #2
"a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects."Source
— Weingarten (citing Landgraf)
(Describing the second step of the retroactivity framework.)
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Quote #3
"If it would, then the court shall not apply the statute retroactively absent clear congressional intent to the contrary."Source
— Weingarten (citing Landgraf)
(The outcome if applying a statute retroactively would have impermissible effects.)
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Quote #4
"If it would not, then the court shall apply the statute to antecedent conduct."Source
— Weingarten (citing Landgraf)
(The outcome if applying a statute retroactively would not have impermissible effects.)
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,572 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page44 of 93
31
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. II, § 211(1), 120 Stat. 587, 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3299 (2006)).
3. Retroactivity under Landgraf
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part framework for determining whether a statute may be applied retroactively. At the first step, “if Congress has expressly prescribed that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent conduct, the inquiry ends and the court enforces the statute as it is written, save for constitutional concerns.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55. If, however, the “statute is ambiguous or contains no express command regarding retroactivity,” then the court must turn to the second step, where “a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.” Id. at 55. “If it would, then the court shall not apply the statute retroactively absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.” Id. “If it would not, then the court shall apply the statute to antecedent conduct.” Id.
B. Discussion
1. There Was No Impermissible Retroactivity in Applying Section 3283 to Maxwell
Maxwell claims that the District Court erred by applying Section 3283’s 2003 amendment to her three counts of conviction, i.e., Counts Three, Four, and Six, because they involved conduct that pre-dated the amendment. As an initial matter, this argument ignores the fact that Counts Three and Six both charge
DOJ-OGR-00021691
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