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Extraction Summary
6
People
4
Organizations
5
Locations
2
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book manuscript/memoir excerpt (house oversight production)
File Size:
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a draft manuscript or memoir by former Israeli Prime Minister/Defense Minister Ehud Barak, stamped with a House Oversight control number. The text details Barak's frustrations with Benjamin Netanyahu's ('Bibi') reluctance to engage in peace initiatives with Palestinians and describes the internal Israeli security cabinet ('Group of Eight') dynamics. It further discusses the strategic threat of a nuclear Iran and the US administration's (Obama via Bob Gates) opposition to Israeli military action against Iran during that period.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Narrator / Author |
Inferred from header '/ BARAK /'. Describes entering 'Bibi's government' (as Defense Minister) to handle the Iran thr...
|
| Benjamin 'Bibi' Netanyahu | Prime Minister of Israel |
Described as delaying peace initiatives; utilizing deadlock for political gain.
|
| Dan Meridor | Israeli Politician / Minister |
Member of the 'Group of Eight' who argued in favor of initiatives alongside the narrator.
|
| Bob Gates | US Secretary of Defense |
Source of information regarding US views on military action against Iran.
|
| Barack Obama | US President |
Mentioned as the 'Obama administration'.
|
| George W. Bush | Former US President |
Referenced regarding US policy continuity on Iran.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Group of Eight |
Inner security cabinet in the Israeli government.
|
|
| Hamas |
Militant group in Gaza posing a missile threat.
|
|
| US Government / Washington |
Partner for security cooperation and anti-missile weapons.
|
|
| Israeli Military, Police and Intelligence |
Credited with preventing a return to the Second Intifada.
|
Timeline (2 events)
c. 2009-2012
Group of Eight discussions regarding peace initiatives.
Israel
Locations (5)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Country of governance.
|
|
|
Location of the security fence.
|
|
|
Source of threat from Hamas.
|
|
|
Refers to the US capital/government.
|
|
|
Nuclear threat location.
|
Relationships (3)
Barak describes Bibi's strategy as politically motivated dithering; Barak joined Bibi's government specifically to handle the Iran issue.
Barak could count on Meridor to argue in favor of initiatives in the Group of Eight.
Barak cites knowledge gained directly from Gates regarding US stance on Iran.
Key Quotes (4)
"In private meetings, Bibi did sometimes engage in discussion about what Israel might do. But he invariably steered the conversation elsewhere, insisting that the real issue was the Palestinians’ lack of any interest in making peace."Source
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Quote #1
"The dithering, delay and deadlock suited him politically."Source
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Quote #2
"It was a race against time. The Iranians were producing more and more yellowcake..."Source
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Quote #3
"...the challenge which had led me into Bibi’s government in the first place: keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,344 characters)
/ BARAK / 130
up in our inner Group of Eight discussions, I could usually count only on Dan
Meridor, and occasionally a handful of others, to argue in favor of any form of
initiative on our side. In private meetings, Bibi did sometimes engage in discussion
about what Israel might do. But he invariably steered the conversation elsewhere,
insisting that the real issue was the Palestinians’ lack of any interest in making
peace.
Meridor, and occasionally a handful of others, to argue in favor of any form of
initiative on our side. In private meetings, Bibi did sometimes engage in discussion
about what Israel might do. But he invariably steered the conversation elsewhere,
insisting that the real issue was the Palestinians’ lack of any interest in making
peace.
My main worry wasn’t the immediate future of the negotiations. For now, the
chances of an agreement seemed close to zero. It was the longer-term damage
Bibi’s approach would do in further delaying any serious move by Israel to put our
relations with the Palestinians on a more stable and sustainable footing. The
dithering, delay and deadlock suited him politically. Ironically, my own efforts on
the security front had also made it easier for us to do next to nothing. Intermittent
outbreaks of violence always remained a threat. Yet the West Bank security fence,
along with our military, police and intelligence measures, meant it was very
unlikely we’d see a return to the full-blown terror war of the second intifada. I was
also working to secure US support for our development of increasingly effective
anti-missile weapons to reduce the threat from Hamas in Gaza. The overall result
was that for many, if not most, Israelis, the conflict with the Palestinians didn’t
impact on their day-to-day lives. It was unseen and largely unfelt.
chances of an agreement seemed close to zero. It was the longer-term damage
Bibi’s approach would do in further delaying any serious move by Israel to put our
relations with the Palestinians on a more stable and sustainable footing. The
dithering, delay and deadlock suited him politically. Ironically, my own efforts on
the security front had also made it easier for us to do next to nothing. Intermittent
outbreaks of violence always remained a threat. Yet the West Bank security fence,
along with our military, police and intelligence measures, meant it was very
unlikely we’d see a return to the full-blown terror war of the second intifada. I was
also working to secure US support for our development of increasingly effective
anti-missile weapons to reduce the threat from Hamas in Gaza. The overall result
was that for many, if not most, Israelis, the conflict with the Palestinians didn’t
impact on their day-to-day lives. It was unseen and largely unfelt.
Still, the effect of the stalemate on our relationship with Washington did matter:
both for our security cooperation on things like the anti-missile weapons and,
crucially, the challenge which had led me into Bibi’s government in the first place:
keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
both for our security cooperation on things like the anti-missile weapons and,
crucially, the challenge which had led me into Bibi’s government in the first place:
keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
* * *
It was a race against time. The Iranians were producing more and more
yellowcake, building more advanced centrifuges, accumulating more low-enriched
uranium. They were getting better at hiding and protecting the network of facilities
being used to try to produce a nuclear weapon. And in the early months of Bibi’s
Prime Ministership, the question we faced wasn’t even whether to take military
action against Iran – something I knew, from Bob Gates and others, that the
Obama administration viewed no more favourably than George W. Bush. It was
yellowcake, building more advanced centrifuges, accumulating more low-enriched
uranium. They were getting better at hiding and protecting the network of facilities
being used to try to produce a nuclear weapon. And in the early months of Bibi’s
Prime Ministership, the question we faced wasn’t even whether to take military
action against Iran – something I knew, from Bob Gates and others, that the
Obama administration viewed no more favourably than George W. Bush. It was
416
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