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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005)
10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789

plaintiffs' favor.” Daventree v. Republic of Azerbaijan,
349 F.Supp.2d 736, 760 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

The alternative basis for personal jurisdiction offered by
Plaintiffs is found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k).
Rule 4(k)(1) provides that service of process establishes
personal jurisdiction when service is authorized by a
federal statute. Here, the ATA provides for personal
jurisdiction through its nationwide service of process
provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a); Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(k)(1)(D). In situations in which Defendants were not
served in the United States pursuant to the ATA, Rule
4(k)(2) acts as a personal jurisdiction gap-filler “in the
enforcement of federal law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2)
advisory committee’s note. For the Court to exercise
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2), “there must
be a federal claim, personal jurisdiction must not exist
over the defendant in New York or any other state, and
the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts
with the United States as a whole such that the exercise of
jurisdiction does not violate Fifth Amendment due
process.” Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 807 (citing
United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F.Supp. 609,
617 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).

[17] Under either basis offered by Plaintiffs, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction must comport with due process
requirements—there must be minimum contacts and the
exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Robertson–Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d
Cir.1996); see also Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at
810–11 (reviewing due process requirements); Ungar v.
Palestinian Auth., 153 F.Supp.2d 76, 87 (D.R.I.2001)
(requiring minimum contacts with the United States for
personal jurisdiction under *558 ATA). If personal
jurisdiction is based on New York’s long-arm statute, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process standards apply. If
jurisdiction is based on Rule 4(k), the Fifth Amendment
applies. The analysis is essentially the same. “The
principal difference is that under the Fifth Amendment the
court can consider the defendant’s contacts throughout the
United States, while under the Fourteenth Amendment
only contacts with the forum state may be considered.”
Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 28 n. 4 (2d Cir.1998).

Plaintiffs claim that Rule 4(k)’s minimum contacts
requirement is satisfied because the Defendants have
purposefully directed their activities at the United States.
See Terrorist Attacks I., 349 F.Supp.2d at 807 (reviewing
the purposefully directed activities theory). This Court has
held that to succeed on this theory, “Plaintiffs must make
a prima facie showing of each Defendant’s personal or
direct participation in the conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’
injuries.” Id. at 809.5 The Court does not require direct

participation in the attacks themselves, but at least
participation in al Qaeda’s terrorist agenda.

[18] In analyzing a defendant’s minimum contacts, courts
distinguish between specific and general jurisdiction.
“Specific jurisdiction exists when the forum exercises
jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit arising out of the
defendant’s contacts with that forum.” Terrorist Attacks I,
349 F.Supp.2d at 811 (citing Metro. Life Ins. 84 F.3d at
567–68). General jurisdiction is based on a defendant’s
general business contacts with the forum. Because the
defendant’s contacts are not related to the suit, a
considerably higher level of contacts is generally required
and the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant’s
continuous and systematic general business contacts with
the forum. Metro. Life. Ins., 84 F.3d at 568; see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S.
408, 414–16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984).

In most instances, Plaintiffs do not specify which basis for
personal jurisdiction applies to each Defendant, or
whether the Defendant was served in the United States
pursuant to the ATA’s nationwide service of process
provision. Accordingly, in analyzing Defendants’
motions, the Court considers as a threshold matter
whether Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of the
Defendant’s minimum contacts with the United States as
a whole.

A. Prince Salman and Prince Naif
Plaintiffs seek to hold Prince Salman responsible for the
attacks of September 11, theorizing that Prince Salman
purposefully directed his activities at the United *559
States by contributing to and raising funds for IIRO,
Sanabel-al Kheer, WAMY, and Al–Haramain. As for
other contacts with the United States, Prince Salman owns
stock in two United States corporations based in Texas,
and, during a trip to the United States in 1989, he met
with President George H.W. Bush and the governor of
Maryland. (Plaintiffs’ Opp’n to Prince Salman Mot. to
Dismiss at 21–22; see generally Parrett Aff.)
Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that Prince Salman’s son
attended school in California, had a residence in the
United States, owned a corporation that breeds race
horses in the United States, and is involved, through his
estate, in a New Jersey lawsuit with a former employee.
Id. They seek jurisdictional discovery to determine if
Prince Salman has other contacts here.

Plaintiffs do not allege that Prince Naif has any general
contacts with the United States. Rather, they claim that he

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