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See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663
(7th Cir. 2000) (providing that individuals who are not
parties to a plea agreement may enforce it, like other
third-party beneficiaries, when the original parties
intended the contract to directly benefit them as third
parties).
Petitioner's alleged status as Epstein's co-conspirator
was the entire basis of her prosecution. The NPA's
language demonstrates that the parties anticipated
that there were additional co-conspirators beyond
those already known. By using "including but not
limited to" before naming some individuals, the
government knowingly extended the benefit of the
bargain to other unnamed individuals who partici-
pated in Epstein's offenses. Whether the government
attorneys personally knew the identities of every such
person is beside the point; they certainly knew there
could be others (hence the language). Ghislaine Maxwell's
name was well known to Epstein's circle and was
referenced in public reporting at the time of the NPA.
But even if she had been entirely unknown, the broad
language of the NPA evidences an intent to cover
whoever might later be deemed a co-conspirator.
Accordingly, Petitioner can rely on the immunity
clause in the NPA. See, e.g., United States v. Florida
West Int'l Airways, 853 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1228 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (dismissing indictment against employee who
fell within the class of employees described in plea
agreement).
The government's suggestion that it would have
drafted the agreement differently had it specifically
had Petitioner in mind is both unprovable and
irrelevant. If anything, the inclusion of specific names
alongside a general category shows the parties knew
some of the players and also wanted to cover any
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