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1.97 MB
Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Congressional report / policy document (page 126)
File Size:
1.97 MB
Summary
This document is page 126 of a House Oversight report titled 'Technology and Research'. It outlines conclusions and recommendations regarding US competitiveness in science and technology against China's aggressive policies and IP theft. It discusses the 'Thousand Talents Program,' the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). Note: While requested as part of an Epstein-related analysis, this specific page contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates; it focuses entirely on national security, IP theft, and academic research integrity.
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| China | ||
| United States | ||
| Thousand Talents Program | ||
| US Government | ||
| Universities |
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
Relationships (1)
recipients of Chinese funding programs, such as the Thousand Talents Program described above
Key Quotes (4)
"China’s aggressive policy is threatening the advantages the United States has long enjoyed as a scientifically creative nation."Source
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Quote #1
"The United States’ current defense of intellectual property has not been effective in refuting appropriation by China, by all accounts the world’s worst offender."Source
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Quote #2
"One of the most glaring factors that facilitates IP theft is the fact that recipients of Chinese funding programs... routinely do not declare their work in China."Source
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Quote #3
"Recipients who are active government employees may be breaking the law, as 18 US Code § 209 prohibits accepting supplemental income for performing the same role that falls under the scope of their government employment."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,894 characters)
126
Conclusion and Recommendations
China’s aggressive policy is threatening the advantages the United States has long enjoyed as a scientifically creative nation. This is occurring as a declining number of US students are getting advanced degrees in science and technology, R&D funds are dropping off, and the nation’s manufacturing base is shrinking.21 When combined with a more scientifically competent China that is also using the discoveries of others, the future of US competitiveness comes into question.
The best source of resiliency in the face of rampant IP theft from China is continued and expanded reinvestment in American innovation. The United States can recover its competitiveness by manufacturing what it invents and rebuilding the scientific foundation on which its competitive edge depends. But unless active efforts are made to prevent countries from inappropriately exploiting American technologies developed at great cost, efforts at national reconstruction will be wasted. The United States’ current defense of intellectual property has not been effective in refuting appropriation by China, by all accounts the world’s worst offender.
A key source of American creativity—the country’s individualism and openness—makes it difficult to implement collective efforts to protect the products of American innovation. Nonetheless, policies and processes can be improved to reduce the risk of misappropriation without compromising America’s innovative capacity. These require improved transparency with better information and screening, enhanced export controls, and stronger investment reviews.
Transparency, better information, and screening
One of the most glaring factors that facilitates IP theft is the fact that recipients of Chinese funding programs, such as the Thousand Talents Program described above, routinely do not declare their work in China. At a minimum, recipients should be required to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).22 Recipients who are active government employees may be breaking the law, as 18 US Code § 209 prohibits accepting supplemental income for performing the same role that falls under the scope of their government employment.23
The US government and universities should also take an evidence- and risk-based assessment when determining whether to admit students into major research programs. The current system, known as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS),24 is designed “to track and monitor schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependents while approved to participate in the US education system.” SEVIS collects data on surnames and first names, addresses, date and country of birth, dependents’ information, nationality/citizenship, funding, school, program name, date of study commencement,
Technology and Research
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020585
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