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Extraction Summary

7
People
7
Organizations
6
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
5
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Government report/investigative narrative (house oversight)
File Size:
Summary

This document appears to be a page from a report or book analyzing the Edward Snowden NSA leaks. It discusses Snowden's motives, distinguishing between his whistle-blowing on domestic surveillance and his theft of 'level 3' files related to sources and methods which he took to Russia. The text hypothesizes that Snowden must have had an accomplice within the NSA facility in Hawaii to access these files and highlights a gap in intelligence regarding his first eleven days in Hong Kong. NOTE: While the prompt references Epstein, this specific page mentions only Edward Snowden and related intelligence matters.

People (7)

Name Role Context
Edward Snowden Subject/Whistle-blower/Spy
Former contractor accused of stealing NSA documents and fleeing to Russia.
Laura Poitras Journalist
Contacted by Snowden; made a video about him in Hong Kong.
Glenn Greenwald Journalist
Contacted by Snowden to publish scoops.
Barton Gellman Journalist
Contacted by Snowden to publish scoops.
Anatoly Kucherena Source (Lawyer)
Provided information that Snowden did not share certain data with journalists but took it to Russia.
Mike Rogers Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence
Speculated Snowden might have been taken to mainland China.
Donald Rumsfeld Former Secretary of Defense
Quoted for the phrase 'A known unknown'.

Organizations (7)

Name Type Context
NSA
National Security Agency; target of the leaks.
Booz Allen Hamilton
Contractor employer of Snowden.
The Guardian
Newspaper that published Snowden's scoops.
Der Spiegel
Newspaper that published Snowden's scoops.
Washington Post
Newspaper that published Snowden's scoops.
National Threat Operations Center
Facility in Hawaii where Snowden worked.
House Select Committee on Intelligence
Congressional body mentioned regarding Mike Rogers.

Timeline (3 events)

2012
Anti-surveillance Crypto party
Hawaii (implied)
Edward Snowden NSA co-workers
2013
Copying of Level 3 files
National Threat Operations Center, Hawaii
2013
First eleven days in Hong Kong (Whereabouts unknown)
Hong Kong

Locations (6)

Location Context
Destination of Snowden and intelligence files.
Location of the National Threat Operations Center.
Location where Snowden fled; specific mention of 'first eleven days' gap.
Destination city for Snowden.
Speculated location of Snowden by Mike Rogers.
Country of origin for intelligence.

Relationships (3)

Edward Snowden Source/Journalist Laura Poitras
Contacted her to blow the whistle; she made a video about him in Hong Kong.
Edward Snowden Source/Journalist Glenn Greenwald
Contacted him to publish scoops.
Edward Snowden Alleged Accomplice Unnamed Co-worker
Author argues Snowden needed assistance to access Level 3 files without administrator privileges.

Key Quotes (5)

"I see no reason to doubt Snowden’s explanation that he stole NSA documents to expose NSA surveillance that he believed was an illicit intrusion into the privacy of individuals."
Source
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Quote #1
"Snowden’s penetration went beyond whistle-blowing, however."
Source
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Quote #2
"He could make all of U.S. communication intelligence 'go dark' all over the world."
Source
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Quote #3
"It therefore seems plausible to me that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate, or vice versa, a co-worker found him."
Source
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Quote #4
"A known unknown."
Source
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Quote #5

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (4,097 characters)

219
such communication intelligence to Russia, it would be the height of naiveté for U.S. or British
intelligence to accept such claims as anything more than part of the cover story.
As for the Snowden’s motive, I see no reason to doubt Snowden’s explanation that he stole
NSA documents to expose NSA surveillance that he believed was an illicit intrusion into the
privacy of individuals. Such disaffection is not a unique situation in the intelligence business.
Many of Russia’s espionage sources before Snowden were also dissatisfied employees who had
access to classified secrets. Like some of them, Snowden used his privileged access to blow the
whistle on what he considered to be the improper activities of the organization for which he
worked. In that sense, I fully accept that he began as a whistle-blower, not as a spy. It was also
as a whistle-blower that he contacted Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald and Barton Gellman, who
published the scoops he provided in the Guardian, Der Spiegel and Washington Post,
Snowden’s penetration went beyond whistle-blowing, however. He copied a vast number of
electronic files, including the level 3 files that contained the NSA’s most sensitive sources and
methods. While these files had little, if anything, to do with domestic surveillance or whistle-
blowing, they gave him the sense of power he demonstrated in asserting that he could make all of
U.S. communication intelligence “go dark” all over the world. We know from Kucherena that he
did not share part of data with journalists. Instead, he took it to Russia.
As far as carrying out the most damaging part of the operation, he could not have acted entirely
alone. It will be recalled that the deepest part of his penetration was during the five weeks he
worked at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii as a contract employee of Booz Allen
Hamilton. It was there that he copied level 3 files, including the so-called road map to the gaps in
American intelligence. During this period, as discussed in Chapter III, Snowden had neither the
passwords nor system administrator’s privileges that would allow him to copy, transfer and steal
the electronic files. He therefore must have obtained that assistance from some who had the
passwords and privileges. Even if that reality does not sit well with the NSA administration, there
is no reason to assume that Snowden was the only disgruntled employee at that NSA facility in
2013. That a dozen or so NSA co-workers attended his anti-surveillance Crypto party in 2012
shows that others shared his sensibilities and antipathy towards NSA surveillance. It therefore
seems plausible to me that he found a co-worker willing to cooperate, or vice versa, a co-worker
found him. To be sure, Snowden might not have been aware of his new accomplice’s true motives
or affiliations. But without some co-worker providing him with entry to the sealed-off computers,
he could not have carried out the penetration. To our knowledge, whoever helped him evidently
did not want to expose himself to prosecution or defect from the NSA. That was Snowden’s
role. By accepting the sole blame in the video that Poitras made about him in Hong Kong,
Snowden shielded anyone else from suspicion, which was, as he told Poitras, his purpose,
Whoever helped him may still be working at the NSA.
To be sure, there remains another glaring gap in the chain of events that led Snowden to
Moscow: his whereabouts and activities during his first eleven days in Hong Kong. Mike Rogers,
the chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, even speculated that Snowden might
have been taken to mainland China during this period. What drove his speculation was the
admission of U.S. intelligence that, despite its vast global resources for searching credit card
charges, banking transactions, hotel registrations, emails, police records and even CCTV cameras,
neither it, nor its allies, were able to find a trace of Snowden. It was, in a phrase later made
famous by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. “A known unknown.” Yet there
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