DOJ-OGR-00009148.jpg
724 KB
Extraction Summary
3
People
1
Organizations
1
Locations
3
Events
1
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
724 KB
Summary
This page from a legal document, filed on February 24, 2022, discusses the legal standard for juror bias in sexual abuse cases. The author argues against a mandatory presumption of bias for jurors who have experienced sexual abuse, distinguishing the current case from a New Hampshire state decision (State v. Ashfar). The document asserts that the court correctly conducted targeted follow-up inquiries to determine impartiality rather than automatically striking such jurors, which is consistent with the law in the circuit.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ashfar | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the case citation "State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018)".
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| Juror 6 | Juror |
Mentioned in a citation from the Ashfar case, where he acknowledged he could not sit on a jury in a sexual assault ca...
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| Torres | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the case citation "See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45" regarding an implied bias finding.
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Court | Government agency |
Referenced throughout the document as the judicial body handling the current case and making rulings on juror selection.
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Timeline (3 events)
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned in the context of a state court decision, "State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018)".
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Relationships (1)
The document states that Juror 6 acknowledged he could not sit on a jury "due to his feelings about his daughter".
Key Quotes (2)
"when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases."Source
— State v. Ashfar decision
(A quote from a New Hampshire state decision cited by the defendant to argue for juror bias.)
DOJ-OGR-00009148.jpg
Quote #1
"average man"Source
— Torres decision (legal term)
(Used to describe a legal test for an implied bias finding, as seen in the Torres case.)
DOJ-OGR-00009148.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,175 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 29 of 49
circumstances will ever recur”). And the New Hampshire state decision prominently cited by the
defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of
experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a
post-verdict hearing, that the juror’s demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and
after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98
(noting that “when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim
who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about
his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could
have differentiated between the two cases.”).
defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of
experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a
post-verdict hearing, that the juror’s demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and
after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98
(noting that “when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim
who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about
his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could
have differentiated between the two cases.”).
Moreover, this Court’s handling of similarly situated jurors in this case is again relevant to
the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on
“average man” test). If it were correct that a juror’s experience with sexual abuse required a
mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike,
and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse
(or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars
of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what
happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court
conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And
rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.
On that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials
involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual
abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not
the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on
“average man” test). If it were correct that a juror’s experience with sexual abuse required a
mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike,
and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse
(or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars
of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what
happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court
conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And
rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.
On that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials
involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual
abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not
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DOJ-OGR-00009148
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