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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 827
Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

10068(MBM), 2003 WL 21664679, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003) (quoting Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d
Cir.1983)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
"Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon
. . . ‘courts should strive to flush out frivo-
lous RICO allegations at an early stage of
the litigation.’” Katzman v. Victoria’s Se-
cret, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y.1996).

[74] The Federal complaint asserts a
RICO claim under § 1962(a), which states
in part: “It shall be unlawful for any per-
son who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person
has participated a principal within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the estab-
lishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). “Because
the conduct constituting a violation of
§ 1962(a) is investment of racketeering in-
come, a plaintiff must allege injury from
the defendant’s investment of the racke-
teering income to recover under
§ 1962(a).” Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897
F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir.1990). The Federal
Plaintiffs have not done that here and
seem to abandon the § 1962(a) claim in
their RICO statements. Accordingly, the
Federal Plaintiffs have not stated a claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).

The Federal Plaintiffs’ RICO statements
against Arab Bank and the SAAR Net-
work assert claims under § 1962(c) and
§ 1962(d). See 03 MDL 1570 Docket
## 307, 309. Subsection (c) states, in
part: “It shall be unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to

conduct or participate, directly or indirect-
ly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s af-
fairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). “The four
elements of Section 1962(c) are ‘(1) conduct
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
(4) of racketeering activity.’” U.S. Fire
Ins. Co. v. United Limousine Serv., Inc.,
303 F.Supp.2d 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y.2004).
“The elements of section 1962(c) must be
established as to each individual defen-
dant.” Id. Paragraph (d) states that it
“shall be unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate any provision of” § 1962(a)-
(c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). “The Second
Circuit has held in the context of a motion
to dismiss that to state a claim under [§ ]
1962(d), the ‘complaint must allege some
factual basis for a finding of a conscious
agreement among the defendants.’” Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, Inc. v. DeFonseca, No.
93 Civ. 2424(CSH), 1996 WL 363128, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (quoting Hecht v.
Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21,
26 n. 4 (2d Cir.1990)); see also Schmidt v.
Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340, 354
(S.D.N.Y.1998) (“Bare and conclusory alle-
gations are insufficient to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss and a plaintiff must plead
facts sufficient to show that each defen-
dant knowingly agreed to participate in
the [RICO] conspiracy.”).

[75, 76] Assuming for now that the
Plaintiffs have pleaded an enterprise,
“[u]nder Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170, 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525
(1993), an alleged RICO defendant must
have had ‘some part in directing’ the ‘oper-
ation or management’ of the enterprise
itself to be liable.” Dubai Islamic Bank v.
Citibank, N.A., 256 F.Supp.2d 158, 164
(S.D.N.Y.2003). The complaints allege the
moving Defendants may have assisted al
Qaeda, but they do not allege “anything
approaching active ‘management or opera-
tion.’” Id. Accordingly, the Court finds

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