DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
717 KB
Extraction Summary
3
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
1
Events
1
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
717 KB
Summary
This legal document describes a ruling made on April 9, 2019, by Chief Judge McMahon, who granted the Government's application to modify a protective order. The judge analyzed the case using Martindell factors and Second Circuit case law, concluding that while the order was necessary for Giuffre to depose Maxwell, Maxwell's reliance on it to shield information from law enforcement was unreasonable. Ultimately, the judge granted the government's application for modification.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| McMahon | Chief Judge |
Granted the Government's application and issued a memorandum and order on April 9, 2019, after analyzing the Martinde...
|
| Maxwell |
A party in the case whose reliance on a protective order was deemed unreasonable by Chief Judge McMahon. Giuffre soug...
|
|
| Giuffre |
A party in the case who likely could not have secured Maxwell's deposition without the protective order.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | government agency |
Submitted an application that was granted by Chief Judge McMahon.
|
| Court | government agency |
The judicial body that considered and granted the Government's application.
|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
The source of case law used by Chief Judge McMahon to evaluate the reasonableness of a party's reliance on a protecti...
|
Timeline (1 events)
2019-04-09
Chief Judge McMahon granted the Government’s application and issued a memorandum and order.
Court
Chief Judge McMahon
Government
Key Quotes (5)
"[i]rregular"Source
— The Court
(Describing the procedural nature of the Government's application.)
DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
Quote #1
"the degree to which . . . the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing[] reasonably relied on the protective order."Source
— Chief Judge McMahon
(A factor considered by the judge in her ruling.)
DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
Quote #2
"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury’s scrutiny."Source
— Chief Judge McMahon
(The judge's reasoning for why Maxwell's reliance on the protective order was unreasonable.)
DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
Quote #3
"the nature of the parties’ reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modification."Source
— Chief Judge McMahon
(The judge's finding regarding the last factor she considered.)
DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
Quote #4
"Giuffre likely could not have secured Maxwell’s deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court involvement—without” the protective order."Source
— Chief Judge McMahon
(Noting what the record indicated regarding the necessity of the protective order for obtaining Maxwell's deposition.)
DOJ-OGR-00003033.jpg
Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,112 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 99 of 239
On or about April 9, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon granted the Government’s application and issued a memorandum and order. (Def. Mot. 3, Exs. F & G). The Court noted that while the Government’s application was procedurally “[i]rregular,” there was precedent for granting the Government’s request and, therefore, the Court would consider the application. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 6, 8-9). The Court found that, contrary to the Government’s arguments, it was appropriate for the Court to analyze the Government’s application in light of the Martindell factors. (Id. at 9-12).
In so doing, Chief Judge McMahon considered, among other things, “the degree to which . . . the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing[] reasonably relied on the protective order.” (Id. at 16). She concluded that such reliance was unreasonable. (Id. at 22). She evaluated the factors under Second Circuit case law that are relevant to assessing whether a party’s reliance on the protective order was reasonable, namely the scope of the protective order, the language of the order itself, the court’s level of inquiry before granting the order, and the nature of reliance on the order. (Id. at 17). She concluded that first three factors favored granting the Government’s application for modification. (Id. at 17-20). Chief Judge McMahon noted that, as the order “plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury’s scrutiny.” (Id. at 18-19).
As to the last factor, Chief Judge McMahon found that “the nature of the parties’ reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modification.” (Id. at 20). She noted that the record indicated that “Giuffre likely could not have secured Maxwell’s deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court involvement—without” the protective order. (Id.). “However, the only thing
72
DOJ-OGR-00003033
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document