DOJ-OGR-00004866.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 54 of 80

to prosecute a case"); Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (noting that “the ultimate
discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”).

Clancy, 192 A.3d at 53 (cleaned up).

As prosecutors are vested with such “tremendous” discretion and authority, our
law has long recognized the special weight that must be accorded to their assurances.
For instance, in the context of statements made during guilty plea negotiations, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that, as a matter of constitutional due
process and as compelled by the principle of fundamental fairness, a defendant generally
is entitled to the benefit of assurances made by the prosecutor. See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).21 Santobello holds that, “when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262 (emphasis
added).

This Court has followed suit with regard to prosecutorial inducements made during
the guilty plea process, insisting that such inducements comport with the due process
guarantee of fundamental fairness. In Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976),
during plea negotiations in a murder case, the prosecutor agreed to recommend to the
sentencing court that Rickey Zuber receive a sentence of seven to fourteen years in
prison if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 442-43. The prosecutor also agreed to consent to a
request that Zuber’s sentence be served concurrently with “back time” that Zuber was
required to serve for a parole violation. Id. at 443. The prosecutor stated the terms of the
agreement on the record, and the trial court accepted the terms of Zuber’s guilty plea and

21 In Santobello, the Supreme Court of the United States did not state explicitly that
it was premising its holding on due process guarantees. Nevertheless, it is only sensible
to read Santobello’s holding as resting upon due process principles because—as Justice
Douglas noted in his concurring opinion—without a constitutional basis the Court would
have lacked jurisdiction over what was otherwise a state law matter. See Santobello, 404
U.S., at 266-67 (Douglas, J. concurring).

[J-100-2020] - 53

DOJ-OGR-00004866