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Extraction Summary
3
People
1
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
724 KB
Summary
This legal document, a page from a court filing, discusses the issue of juror bias in sexual abuse cases. The author argues against a mandatory presumption of bias for jurors who are survivors of sexual abuse, citing legal precedents like State v. Ashfar and Torres. The document asserts that the court correctly conducted targeted inquiries into jurors' ability to be impartial, rather than automatically striking them, noting that a contrary rule would disqualify a large portion of the jury pool.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ashfar | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation 'State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018)'.
|
| Juror 6 | Juror |
Mentioned as a juror who acknowledged he could not sit on a previous sexual assault case due to feelings about his da...
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| Torres | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation 'Torres, 128 F.3d at 45'.
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Court | government agency |
Referenced throughout the document as the judicial body handling the case and making decisions on juror bias.
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Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned in the context of a state court decision ('New Hampshire state decision') and a case citation ('N.H. 2018').
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Relationships (1)
The document states that Juror 6 could not sit on a previous jury "due to his feelings about his daughter".
Key Quotes (2)
"when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases."Source
— State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 98 (N.H. 2018)
(Quoted from a New Hampshire state court decision to illustrate a point about juror bias.)
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Quote #1
"average man"Source
— Torres, 128 F.3d at 45
(Mentioned as the basis for an implied bias finding in the Torres case.)
DOJ-OGR-00009827.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,175 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 29 of 49
circumstances will ever recur”). And the New Hampshire state decision prominently cited by the
defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of
experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a
post-verdict hearing, that the juror’s demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and
after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98
(noting that “when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim
who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about
his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could
have differentiated between the two cases.”).
defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of
experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a
post-verdict hearing, that the juror’s demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and
after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98
(noting that “when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim
who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about
his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could
have differentiated between the two cases.”).
Moreover, this Court’s handling of similarly situated jurors in this case is again relevant to
the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on
“average man” test). If it were correct that a juror’s experience with sexual abuse required a
mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike,
and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse
(or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars
of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what
happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court
conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And
rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.
On that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials
involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual
abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not
the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on
“average man” test). If it were correct that a juror’s experience with sexual abuse required a
mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike,
and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse
(or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars
of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what
happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court
conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And
rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.
On that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials
involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual
abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not
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DOJ-OGR-00009827
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