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Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page10 of 12

07/28/2020 34 AFFIDAVIT of Alex Rossmiller by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (Rossmiller, Alex)
(Entered: 07/28/2020)

07/29/2020 35 LETTER REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to
Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July 29, 2020 re 29 LETTER
MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July
27, 2020 re: Proposed Protective Order .. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/29/2020)

07/30/2020 36 PROTECTIVE ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell...regarding procedures to be
followed that shall govern the handling of confidential material. SO ORDERED:
(Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)

07/30/2020 37 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Both parties have
asked for the Court to enter a protective order. While they agree on most of the
language, two areas of dispute have emerged. First, Ms. Maxwell seeks language
allowing her to publicly reference alleged victims or witnesses who have spoken on
the public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation relating to Ms. Maxwell
or Jeffrey Epstein. Second, Ms. Maxwell seeks language restricting potential
Government witnesses and their counsel from using discovery materials for any
purpose other than preparing for the criminal trial in this action. The Government has
proposed contrary language on both of these issues. For the following reasons, the
Court adopts the Government's proposed protective order Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), "[a]t any time the court may, for good cause, deny,
restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief." The good
cause standard "requires courts to balance several interests, including whether
dissemination of the discovery materials inflicts hazard to others... whether the
imposition of the protective order would prejudice the defendant," and "the public's
interest in the information." United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 522
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). The party seeking to restrict disclosure bears the burden of showing
good cause. Cf. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004).
First, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden of showing good cause
with regard to restricting the ability of Ms. Maxwell to publicly reference alleged
victims and witnesses other than those who have publicly identified themselves in this
litigation. As a general matter, it is undisputed that there is a strong and specific
interest in protecting the privacy of alleged victims and witnesses in this case that
supports restricting the disclosure of their identities. Dkt. No. 29 at 3 (acknowledging
that as a baseline the protective order should "prohibit[] Ms. Maxwell, defense
counsel, and others on the defense team from disclosing or disseminating the identity
of any alleged victim or potential witness referenced in the discovery materials"); see
also United States v. Corley, No. 13-cr-48, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194426, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016). The Defense argues this interest is significantly diminished
for individuals who have spoken on the public record about Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey
Epstein, because they have voluntarily chosen to identify themselves. But not all
accusations or public statements are equal. Deciding to participate in or contribute to a
criminal investigation or prosecution is a far different matter than simply making a
public statement "relating to" Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein, particularly since such a
statement might have occurred decades ago and have no relevance to the charges in
this case. These individuals still maintain a significant privacy interest that must be
safeguarded. The exception the Defense seeks is too broad and risks undermining the
protections of the privacy of witnesses and alleged victims that is required by law. In
contrast, the Government's proffered language would allow Ms. Maxwell to publicly
reference individuals who have spoken by name on the record in this case. It also
allows the Defense to "referenc[e] the identities of individuals they believe may be
relevant... to Potential Defense Witnesses and their counsel during the course of the
investigation and preparation of the defense case at trial." Dkt. No. 33-1, 5. This
proposal adequately balances the interests at stake. And as the Government's letter
notes, see Dkt. No. 33 at 4, to the extent that the Defense needs an exception to the
protective order for a specific investigative purpose, they can make applications to the
Court on a case-by-case basis. Second, restrictions on the ability of potential
witnesses and their counsel to use discovery materials for purposes other than
preparing for trial in this case are unwarranted. The request appears unprecedented
despite the fact that there have been many high-profile criminal matters that had
related civil litigation. The Government labors under many restrictions including Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other
policies of the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern

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