DOJ-OGR-00003105.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 171 of 239

therein. See Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190-91 (joining counts involving use of businesses to commit fraud with a count of falsely swearing in bankruptcy court that the defendant “had not engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years”).53 Accordingly, and consistent with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion.

The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different time periods. To be sure, Counts One through Four charge conduct involving certain victims from 1994 to 1997, while the perjury counts charge statements made in 2016 in a case concerning Giuffre’s abuse from 1999 to 2002. However, the specific statements charged in Count Five and Count Six directly relate to the conduct charged in Counts One through Four, including, in one instance, a specific victim identified as relevant to those counts. And those statements were not time-bound or restricted to Giuffre. For instance, the defendant denied the existence of any scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, not the existence of such a scheme between 1999 and 2002, or a scheme specifically focused on Giuffre. The defendant also denied ever giving anyone a massage, specifically including Epstein and Minor Victim-2. She did not limit her denial to Giuffre or to a particular time period. There is, accordingly, a strong connection between the truth or falsity of the defendant’s broad denials and her acts in the period at issue in the substantive counts. The cases on which the defendant relies are factually inapposite and do not support her argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment where the only similarly was the defendant’s manipulation of people he had employed—different

53 While the defendant may argue that the fact that her deposition, unlike Ruiz, did not involve criminal authorities counsels in favor of a different outcome, as discussed further below, the prospect of a criminal prosecution was nonetheless plainly on her mind at the time of the depositions, as evidenced by the myriad arguments she herself makes in support of her motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena to Boies Schiller. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4, Def. Mot. 11 at 2).

144

DOJ-OGR-00003105