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Extraction Summary

9
People
7
Organizations
10
Locations
4
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Book manuscript / memoir excerpt (house oversight evidence)
File Size:
Summary

This document appears to be page 384 of a memoir or book by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), included in House Oversight evidence files. The text details the political fallout after the failure of the Camp David summit, Barak's refusal to form a coalition with Ariel Sharon due to disagreements over the Oslo process, and his reliance on a 'safety net' deal with the Shas party. It describes escalating violence by Islamic Jihad and Hamas in late 2000/early 2001 and Barak's decision to continue peace talks via negotiators (Ben-Ami, Sher, etc.) despite the violence, at President Clinton's insistence.

People (9)

Name Role Context
Ehud Barak Narrator / Prime Minister of Israel
The 'I' in the text; discussing negotiations, coalition building, and security decisions. Indicated by header '/ BARA...
Arik (Ariel Sharon) Likud Party Leader
Demanded a 'full divorce' from Camp David and an end to the Oslo process.
Yasser Arafat Palestinian Leader
Rejected the peace package; blamed by narrator for choosing violence over diplomacy.
Bill Clinton US President
Insisted on one final attempt to get a peace deal.
Yossi Beilin Labor Party Politician
Led the 'Oslo-era doves' in Labor; worked out a deal with Shas.
Shlomo Ben-Ami Israeli Negotiator
Authorized by Barak to continue talks.
Gili Sher Israeli Negotiator
Authorized by Barak to continue talks.
Amnon Lipkin Israeli Negotiator
Authorized by Barak to continue talks.
Yossi Ginossar Israeli Negotiator
Authorized by Barak to continue talks.

Organizations (7)

Name Type Context
Likud
Labor Party
Shas (Sephardi Orthodox party)
Knesset
Islamic Jihad
Hamas
House Oversight Committee

Timeline (4 events)

Late 2000 (Contextual)
Islamic Jihad car bomb attack
Mahaneh Yehudah market, Jerusalem
Late 2000 (Contextual)
School bus bombing
Gaza settlements
Late 2000 (Contextual)
Car bombing
Hadera
Unknown perpetrators
Late 2000 (Contextual)
Snipers opening fire
Gilo (Jerusalem suburb)
Palestinian snipers

Relationships (3)

Ehud Barak Political Rivals Ariel Sharon
Barak refused Sharon's conditions for coalition support regarding ending the Oslo process.
Ehud Barak Diplomatic Bill Clinton
Barak felt responsible to continue peace efforts at Clinton's insistence to maintain American support.
Yossi Beilin Political Negotiation Shas Party
Beilin worked out a deal with Shas to provide a safety net for the government.

Key Quotes (4)

"Arik, however, said he wanted not just a “full divorce” from Camp David. He insisted we formally declare an end to the entire Oslo process."
Source
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Quote #1
"I told him that was a price I was not prepared to pay for his support."
Source
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Quote #2
"Alarmed at the prospect of a having Sharon in the government, the Oslo-era doves in Labor, led by Yossi Beilin, worked out a new deal with Shas."
Source
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Quote #3
"I wasn’t prepared to put us in the position of appearing to stonewall his [Clinton's] efforts, and encourage the false narrative that Israeli “intransigence” was somehow frustrating Arafat’s readiness to make peace."
Source
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Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,716 characters)

/ BARAK / 98
in legal and diplomatic terms, null and void. The package Arafat had ultimately rejected had not even been presented by me. It was an American proposal. Besides, it was obvious no serious negotiations were going to happen anyway for the foreseeable future. Arik, however, said he wanted not just a “full divorce” from Camp David. He insisted we formally declare an end to the entire Oslo process.
I told him that was a price I was not prepared to pay for his support. Despite the failure of the summit, and the terrible human cost from Arafat’s choice of violence over diplomacy, there was a wide international recognition that it was the Palestinians, not Israel, who were responsible. For us to end the Oslo process meant inviting accusations we’d never intended to reach a peace agreement in the first place, and that it was Israel that was closing the door. We would also risk forfeiting the American support we’d secured by our efforts to reach a peace deal, an asset all Israeli governments would benefit from in other circumstances and contexts in the future.
Fortunately, I had an alternative to a coalition with the Likud. Alarmed at the prospect of a having Sharon in the government, the Oslo-era doves in Labor, led by Yossi Beilin, worked out a new deal with Shas. The Sephardi Orthodox party was still not prepared to rejoin the cabinet, but it did promise a “safety net” in the Knesset to ensure we would not have to worry about no-confidence votes while confronting the Palestinian violence. I knew Shas’s support would waver if there was a resumption of serious peace negotiations. Still, as Clinton continued to insist we make one final attempt to get a deal, I felt we had a responsibility to play our part. I wasn’t prepared to put us in the position of appearing to stonewall his efforts, and encourage the false narrative that Israeli “intransigence” was somehow frustrating Arafat’s readiness to make peace.
The Palestinian campaign of violence was getting worse. An Islamic Jihad car bomb near Mahaneh Yehudah market in Jerusalem injured nearly a dozen people and left two dead. Hamas blew up a school bus in one of the Gaza settlements, killing two more people. In Hadera, halfway up the coast from Tel Aviv to Haifa, a car bomb on a main street left two people dead and more than 60 injured. Palestinian snipers from near Bethlehem began opening fire on Gilo, one of the post-1967 Jewish suburbs of Jerusalem, and home to more than 30,000 people. Yet despite all this, I authorized Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gili Sher, Amnon Lipkin and Yossi Ginossar to continue talks with Palestinian negotiators on the terms of the President’s last-ditch peace proposal.
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