HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024966.jpg
2.51 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
5
Organizations
9
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Geopolitical analysis / report page (house oversight committee exhibit)
File Size:
2.51 MB
Summary
This document page, marked as a House Oversight exhibit, analyzes the stability of the Assad regime in Syria during the early stages of the uprising (circa 2011). It discusses the internal power dynamic between Bashar al-Assad and his hardline brother Maher, outlines external threats from neighboring countries and exiles, and references WikiLeaks revelations regarding US State Department funding of Syrian opposition groups.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Bashar al-Assad | President of Syria |
Subject of the analysis; discussing his potential loss of authority and response to protests.
|
| Maher al-Assad | Commander of the Republican Guard |
Brother of Bashar; described as a hardliner advocating for crushing protests by force.
|
| Hafez al-Assad | Former President of Syria |
Father of Bashar; established the autocratic system Bashar inherited.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Republican Guard |
Syrian military unit commanded by Maher al-Assad.
|
|
| Ba’ath Party |
Ruling political party in Syria; reports of member resignations.
|
|
| US State Department |
Reportedly financed opponents of Bashar al-Assad.
|
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| WikiLeaks |
Released diplomatic cables regarding US funding of Syrian opposition.
|
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| The Washington Post |
Published reports on the WikiLeaks cables in mid-April.
|
Timeline (2 events)
Mid-April (2011 implied)
Locations (9)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Primary subject location.
|
|
|
Neighboring country listed as hosting enemies of the regime.
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Neighboring country listed as hosting enemies of the regime.
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Neighboring country listed as hosting enemies of the regime.
|
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Neighboring country listed as hosting enemies of the regime.
|
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Neighboring country listed as hosting enemies of the regime; shapes Syrian foreign policy.
|
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Location of Syrian exiles and a financed opposition network.
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Location of Syrian exiles.
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Location of Syrian exiles and source of State Dept funding.
|
Relationships (2)
Maher is brother to Bashar and described as potentially usurping authority.
Hafez bequeathed the autocratic system to Bashar.
Key Quotes (3)
"Bashar still seems to have a chance... but only if he calls a halt to the killing of protesters and takes the lead of the reform movement"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024966.jpg
Quote #1
"Indeed, Bashar may already have lost authority to men like his brother, Maher al-Assad"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024966.jpg
Quote #2
"the State Department secretly financed a London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m between 2005 and 2010"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024966.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,983 characters)
9
At the time of writing, Bashar still seems to have a chance, if a slim
one, of stabilising the situation and perhaps earning a further spell in
power -- but only if he calls a halt to the killing of protesters and
takes the lead of the reform movement, and in effect carries out a
silent coup against the hardliners.
But it may well be too late for that. Indeed, Bashar may already have
lost authority to men like his brother, Maher al-Assad, commander of
the regime’s Republican Guard, who seems to advocate crushing the
protests by force. If the army and the security services remain loyal, it
will be difficult for the opposition to unseat the regime. But there
have been ominous rumours of army defections as well as reports that
some members of the Ba’ath Party have resigned.
It needs to be recognised that the Assad regime does have determined
enemies, at home and abroad, who conspire against it in the
neighbouring countries -- Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
also Israel -- and among Syrian exiles in London, Paris and the US.
These enemies have smelled blood. Riding on the turbulent wave of
popular dissent, they will not easily give up. According to US
diplomatic cables, released by WikiLeaks and published in mid-April
in The Washington Post, the State Department secretly financed a
London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m
between 2005 and 2010.
A continuous whole
It is probably fair to view Bashar al-Assad’s term of office and that of
his father as a single continuous whole. Not only did Hafez al-Assad
decide that Bashar should succeed him, but he also bequeathed to
him an autocratic system based on an all-powerful centralising
presidency, and a set of principles and external allies and opponents
which together determine Syria’s foreign policy. Bashar’s whole
career -- like that of his father before him -- has been shaped by
Syria’s contest with Israel. Syria has had to live, fight and survive in
one, of stabilising the situation and perhaps earning a further spell in
power -- but only if he calls a halt to the killing of protesters and
takes the lead of the reform movement, and in effect carries out a
silent coup against the hardliners.
But it may well be too late for that. Indeed, Bashar may already have
lost authority to men like his brother, Maher al-Assad, commander of
the regime’s Republican Guard, who seems to advocate crushing the
protests by force. If the army and the security services remain loyal, it
will be difficult for the opposition to unseat the regime. But there
have been ominous rumours of army defections as well as reports that
some members of the Ba’ath Party have resigned.
It needs to be recognised that the Assad regime does have determined
enemies, at home and abroad, who conspire against it in the
neighbouring countries -- Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
also Israel -- and among Syrian exiles in London, Paris and the US.
These enemies have smelled blood. Riding on the turbulent wave of
popular dissent, they will not easily give up. According to US
diplomatic cables, released by WikiLeaks and published in mid-April
in The Washington Post, the State Department secretly financed a
London-based network of Bashar’s opponents to the tune of $12m
between 2005 and 2010.
A continuous whole
It is probably fair to view Bashar al-Assad’s term of office and that of
his father as a single continuous whole. Not only did Hafez al-Assad
decide that Bashar should succeed him, but he also bequeathed to
him an autocratic system based on an all-powerful centralising
presidency, and a set of principles and external allies and opponents
which together determine Syria’s foreign policy. Bashar’s whole
career -- like that of his father before him -- has been shaped by
Syria’s contest with Israel. Syria has had to live, fight and survive in
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024966
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