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699 KB
Extraction Summary
6
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
3
Events
1
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal brief / court filing (page 65 of 113)
File Size:
699 KB
Summary
This document is page 65 of a legal brief (Case 22-1426) filed on February 28, 2023. The text presents a legal argument regarding statutory interpretation, specifically debating whether a 'categorical approach' or a 'case-specific approach' should apply to 8 U.S.C. § 3283. The brief argues that the District Court erred by using a case-specific approach, citing conflicts with Supreme Court precedents such as *Nijhawan v. Holder*, *James v. U.S.*, and *Kawashima*.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Weingarten | Legal Case Subject |
Referenced in a case citation regarding statutory construction.
|
| Nijhawan | Legal Case Subject |
Party in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
|
| Holder | Legal Case Subject |
Party in Nijhawan v. Holder.
|
| James | Legal Case Subject |
Party in James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
|
| Kawashima | Legal Case Subject |
Party in Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483.
|
| Johnson | Legal Case Subject |
Party in Johnson v. U.S., 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Court |
U.S. Supreme Court, referenced as the authority for legal precedents.
|
|
| District Court |
The lower court whose decision is being challenged/appealed in this document.
|
|
| DOJ |
Department of Justice (inferred from footer DOJ-OGR).
|
Timeline (3 events)
Relationships (1)
The document argues the District Court misread Supreme Court precedent (Nijhawan).
Key Quotes (4)
"Weingarten does not move the needle because it did not purport to decide how § 3283 should actually be construed."Source
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Quote #1
"The District Court cited Nijhawan for the proposition that 'the word ‘involves’ generally means courts should look to the circumstances of an offense as committed in each case.'"Source
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Quote #2
"Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the clause, 'offense that … involves fraud or deceit,' ... is analyzed categorically, directly contrary to the District Court’s apparent misreading of Nijhawan."Source
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Quote #3
"This Court should decline to ratify the District Court’s case-specific approach for an additional reason: it would conflict with at least two other circuits that have examined § 3283 and concluded that a categorical approach applies."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,652 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page65 of 113
(emphasis added). Weingarten does not move the needle because it did not purport
to decide how § 3283 should actually be construed.
to decide how § 3283 should actually be construed.
The District Court’s reliance on Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), a
case interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), was likewise misplaced. The
District Court cited Nijhawan for the proposition that “the word ‘involves’
generally means courts should look to the circumstances of an offense as
committed in each case.” A148. But Nijhawan says otherwise; there, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its prior case law holding that statutory “language, covering
‘crime[s]’ that ‘involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another’ … refers to crimes as generically defined.” 557 U.S. at 36
(emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192, 202
(2007)).10 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the clause, “offense
that … involves fraud or deceit,” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), is analyzed
categorically, directly contrary to the District Court’s apparent misreading of
Nijhawan. Compare Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483 (“employ[ing] a categorical
approach”) with A148.
case interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), was likewise misplaced. The
District Court cited Nijhawan for the proposition that “the word ‘involves’
generally means courts should look to the circumstances of an offense as
committed in each case.” A148. But Nijhawan says otherwise; there, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its prior case law holding that statutory “language, covering
‘crime[s]’ that ‘involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another’ … refers to crimes as generically defined.” 557 U.S. at 36
(emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192, 202
(2007)).10 Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the clause, “offense
that … involves fraud or deceit,” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), is analyzed
categorically, directly contrary to the District Court’s apparent misreading of
Nijhawan. Compare Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483 (“employ[ing] a categorical
approach”) with A148.
This Court should decline to ratify the District Court’s case-specific
approach for an additional reason: it would conflict with at least two other circuits
that have examined § 3283 and concluded that a categorical approach applies. See
approach for an additional reason: it would conflict with at least two other circuits
that have examined § 3283 and concluded that a categorical approach applies. See
10 In Johnson v. U.S., the Supreme Court overruled James on other grounds, but
expressly reaffirmed James’ categorical approach. See 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015).
expressly reaffirmed James’ categorical approach. See 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015).
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DOJ-OGR-00021112
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