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103 Minn. L. Rev. 844, *908

rationale that oversight of prosecutors lies in the political process rather than judicial enforcement of legal parameters for charging. 218 Third, popular and political pressure has succeeded in redressing some underenforcement practices by prosecutors (and police) when victim groups, or issues tied to specific offenses, achieve political potency. Intoxicated driving is perhaps the best example of harmful wrongdoing about which many enforcement agencies have successfully revised their policies to increase enforcement. 219 Domestic violence and sexual assaults are other examples where enforcement shifts have been more limited but still significant. 220

Responses by local agencies to this type of pressure have taken three basic forms. First, chief prosecutors adopted internal office policies that mandate - or set a strong presumption for - [*909] prosecution of specific crimes when evidence is sufficient. 221 Second, prosecutors get specialized training on how to address the particular challenges posed by specific kinds of cases such as domestic violence or sexual assault. 222 Finally, many offices have established dedicated, in-house units of prosecutors who specialize in these same kinds of crimes. 223 States legislatures have encouraged these reforms, 224 but virtually everywhere, the adoption, content, and enforcement of policies is left to local chief prosecutors. No legislation sets specific charging criteria, authorized judicial review, or gives enforceable rights to victims. 225

These responses to underenforcement are meaningful, but their form is more political than legal. They are the kinds of responses produced by a system of electorally accountable prosecutors and legislatures. 226 Often they are in large part attributable to successful political efforts by advocacy groups. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for example, successfully urged reforms of laws and enforcement practices against intoxicated driving. 227 Feminist groups and women's advocates play important, ongoing roles in reforming police and prosecution policies, substantive criminal laws, and evidence rules for domestic [*910] violence and sexual assault offenses. 228 These efforts have succeeded in changing attitudes, professional cultures, and enforcement practices in police and prosecution agencies that had contributed to underenforcement in these areas. 229 Prosecution units specializing in offenses such as domestic violence, for example, strengthen professional culture committed to enforcement by attracting lawyers who share that commitment and who develop expertise to act on it. 230

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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 3095741. Without grounds for federal jurisdiction - such as conduct involving interstate travel or occurring on federal property - sexual assaults and other violent offenses are the exclusive province of state officials. Kim, supra, at 277. For examples of the limits built into federal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2016) (knowingly recruiting or enticing minors to engage in commercial sex acts); 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2016) (prohibiting travel in interstate commerce for purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minor females).

150 The scholarly literature on public corruption is considerable. For a short overview of the debate and the federal law, see David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar Crime, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1377-94 (2008). For longer treatments, see generally Political Corruption: A Handbook (Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989) (compiling comparative scholarly work on political corruption); Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption: A Handbook (Paul M. Heywood ed., 2015) (focusing on international and comparative corruption issues).

151 See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (describing quid pro quo requirement for federal bribery offense, 18 U.S.C. § 201, in relation to extortion and honest-services fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§1951(a) & 1346, used to prosecute corruption by state officials); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 407-09 (2010) (clarifying quid pro quo requirements for bribery and kickback conduct in honest-services fraud prosecutions).

152 See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (criminalizing bribes and gratuities); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing theft or bribery related to federally funded programs); 18 U.S.C.§§1341, 1343, 1346 (2016) (criminalizing mail, wire, and "honest services" fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (criminalizing extortion "under color of official right").

153 See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Only Three States Score Higher Than D+ in State Integrity Investigation; 11 Flunk, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18693/only-three-states-score-higher-d-state-integrity-investigation-11-flunk (last updated Nov. 23, 2015) (scoring states and explaining methodology; all but three states scored a "D+" or below on A-to-F scale); see also Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency Int'l (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table (ranking 174 countries by corruption scores; the United States ranked eighteenth). On the challenges facing corruption measures, see generally Staffan Andersson, Beyond Unidimensional Measurement of Corruption, 19 Pub. Integrity 58 (2017) (analyzing the challenges posed by treating corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon); Adriana S. Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence From Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions, 18 Pub. Integrity 127 (2016)

DAVID SCHOEN

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