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Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing / legal opinion (page 35 of the document, labeled page 62 of 239 in the pdf bundle)
File Size:
768 KB
Summary
This document is page 35 (pacer page 62) of a legal filing in the case United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell. The text is a legal analysis rejecting Maxwell's arguments to dismiss the indictment based on the statute of limitations. The court distinguishes the precedents cited by Maxwell (specifically Thom v. Ashcroft and Toussie v. United States), arguing that they do not prevent the retroactive application of the relevant statute of limitations.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant |
Argues against the retroactive application of statutes of limitations; her motion to dismiss is being analyzed.
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| Judge Calabresi | Judge (Second Circuit) |
Cited by Maxwell for a dissenting/concurring opinion in Thom v. Ashcroft regarding Landgraf.
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| Toussie | Defendant in case precedent |
Referenced in Toussie v. United States regarding draft registration and limitations periods.
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States District Court |
Implied by the case header Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE.
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| Supreme Court |
Referenced regarding future decisions and past precedents (Toussie v. United States).
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| 2d Cir. |
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, referenced in citation Thom v. Ashcroft.
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| Congress |
Mentioned regarding legislative intent for statute of limitations extensions.
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Timeline (1 events)
Relationships (1)
Maxwell cites dictum by a single judge (Calabresi) in a non-criminal case to support her argument.
Key Quotes (4)
"That footnote is too slender a reed to support Maxwell’s entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely."Source
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Quote #1
"Maxwell cites no precedent for the proposition that, in the criminal context... Landgraf forecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution."Source
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Quote #2
"The defendant also argues that 'criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose'"Source
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Quote #3
"But that presumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limitations to apply purely prospectively"Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,264 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 62 of 239
Facto Clause and Landgraf’s second step.”). Maxwell cites no precedent for the proposition that,
in the criminal context, much less in the context of criminal statutes of limitations, Landgraf
forecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution. Maxwell instead cites dictum by a single
judge in a non-criminal case that, “[i]f [he] were judging on a clean slate,” he would read Landgraf
to prohibit some retroactive application of statutes that, “while not the equivalent of criminal ex
post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of” Landgraf’s considerations, and that he “expect[ed]
that the Supreme Court’s future decisions” would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369
F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., “[s]peaking only for [him]self”). That footnote is
too slender a reed to support Maxwell’s entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely.
Moreover, Maxwell has identified no case in the intervening seventeen years in which the Supreme
Court has embraced Judge Calabresi’s view. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (finding arguments
relating to Judge Calabresi’s footnote unpersuasive, and concluding that Section 3283 applies
retroactively under Landgraf). As Weingarten recognized, any court to hold that “retroactively
extending a filing period for live charges is a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect under
Landgraf” will be the first to do so. 865 F.3d at 58.
in the criminal context, much less in the context of criminal statutes of limitations, Landgraf
forecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution. Maxwell instead cites dictum by a single
judge in a non-criminal case that, “[i]f [he] were judging on a clean slate,” he would read Landgraf
to prohibit some retroactive application of statutes that, “while not the equivalent of criminal ex
post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of” Landgraf’s considerations, and that he “expect[ed]
that the Supreme Court’s future decisions” would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369
F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., “[s]peaking only for [him]self”). That footnote is
too slender a reed to support Maxwell’s entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely.
Moreover, Maxwell has identified no case in the intervening seventeen years in which the Supreme
Court has embraced Judge Calabresi’s view. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (finding arguments
relating to Judge Calabresi’s footnote unpersuasive, and concluding that Section 3283 applies
retroactively under Landgraf). As Weingarten recognized, any court to hold that “retroactively
extending a filing period for live charges is a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect under
Landgraf” will be the first to do so. 865 F.3d at 58.
The defendant also argues that “criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted
in favor of repose,” relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S.
112, 115 (1970). Toussie considered whether a person’s failure to register for the draft was a
continuing offense subjecting him to prosecution eight years later, notwithstanding the five-year
limitations period in Section 3282. Id. at 114. In that context, the Court invoked a presumption
in favor of repose when determining whether the underlying conduct was time-barred. But that
presumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limitations
to apply purely prospectively, a question governed by Landgraf. Only one case has applied
in favor of repose,” relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S.
112, 115 (1970). Toussie considered whether a person’s failure to register for the draft was a
continuing offense subjecting him to prosecution eight years later, notwithstanding the five-year
limitations period in Section 3282. Id. at 114. In that context, the Court invoked a presumption
in favor of repose when determining whether the underlying conduct was time-barred. But that
presumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limitations
to apply purely prospectively, a question governed by Landgraf. Only one case has applied
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