DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
700 KB
Extraction Summary
5
People
7
Organizations
1
Locations
0
Events
2
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing / legal brief (page 11 of 23)
File Size:
700 KB
Summary
This document is page 11 of a legal filing (Case 20-3061) dated September 16, 2020. It presents legal arguments regarding the 'collateral-order doctrine' and protective orders in criminal cases, arguing that such orders are generally not subject to interlocutory appeal. The text cites various precedents (Firestone, Caparros, Pappas) to support the argument that restricting the dissemination of discovery materials does not violate First Amendment rights and that challenges to such orders should await final judgment.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Risjord | Legal Citation Name |
Referenced in case citation Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord
|
| Caparros | Legal Citation Name |
Referenced in case citation United States v. Caparros
|
| Pappas | Legal Citation Name |
Referenced in case citation United States v. Pappas
|
| Cohen | Legal Precedent Name |
Referenced in the context of the 'collateral order doctrine of Cohen'
|
| Rhinehart | Legal Citation Name |
Referenced in case citation Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Court |
Referenced regarding the collateral-order doctrine
|
|
| 2d Cir. |
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, referenced in multiple citations
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|
| Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. |
Legal case citation
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| H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. |
Legal case citation
|
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| Siemens Medical Sys., Inc. |
Legal case citation
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| Seattle Times Co. |
Legal case citation
|
|
| DOJ |
Implied by Bates stamp 'DOJ-OGR'
|
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Jurisdiction of the cited cases (Second Circuit)
|
Key Quotes (5)
"When applying the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court has 'generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.'"Source
DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
Quote #1
"protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal."Source
DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
Quote #2
"We hold that this collateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291"Source
DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
Quote #3
"a litigant does not have 'an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery,' such protective orders do not amount to an impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment."Source
DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
Quote #4
"adjudication of any such right can await final judgment on the underlying charges"Source
DOJ-OGR-00019377.jpg
Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,700 characters)
Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page11 of 23
14. When applying the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court
has “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise has
consistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged
by the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this
collateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . .”); United
States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To the extent that the
[protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials
exchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal.”); see also
H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.
1986) (“The district court’s denial of modification [of a protective order] does not
fall within the ‘collateral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant does not
have ‘an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained
through pretrial discovery,’” such protective orders do not amount to an
impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at
25 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)). Even where a
litigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant’s right
to release documents outside of criminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right
can await final judgment on the underlying charges” because the “purported right
has “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise has
consistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged
by the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this
collateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . .”); United
States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To the extent that the
[protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials
exchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal.”); see also
H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.
1986) (“The district court’s denial of modification [of a protective order] does not
fall within the ‘collateral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant does not
have ‘an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained
through pretrial discovery,’” such protective orders do not amount to an
impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at
25 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)). Even where a
litigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant’s right
to release documents outside of criminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right
can await final judgment on the underlying charges” because the “purported right
11
DOJ-OGR-00019377
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