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context, and history of § 3283 show that Congress
intended courts to apply the statute using a case-
specific approach. The Third Circuit reached the same
conclusion in United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186,
196 (3d Cir. 2015).
The Court sees no reason to depart from the
reasoning in Weingarten. First, "[t]he Supreme Court's
modern categorical approach jurisprudence is confined
to the post-conviction contexts of criminal sentencing
and immigration deportation cases." Weingarten, 865
F.3d at 58. To the extent that the categorical approach
is ever appropriate in other contexts, it is in-
appropriate here.
The Court begins with the statute's text. Statutes
that call for application of the categorical approach
typically deal with the elements of an offense in a prior
criminal conviction. Id. at 59. "The language of § 3283,
by contrast, reaches beyond the offense and its legal
elements to the conduct 'involv[ed]' in the offense. That
linguistic expansion indicates Congress intended courts to
look beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether
§ 3283 applied." Id. at 59-60 (alteration in original)
(quoting § 3283). Maxwell cites one case holding
otherwise, but that case involved a venue statute
presenting significantly different concerns. See United
States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has likewise held that a statute
which uses the language "an offense that... involves
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000" is "consistent with a
circumstance-specific approach." Nijhawan v. Holder,
557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the
word "involves" generally means that courts should
look to the circumstances of an offense as committed
in each case. This reading accords with a robust
a
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