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Even while he used his position as a system administrator at Dell for the NSA to download
secret documents, Snowden remained in touch with some of the leading figures in the TOR
project under his various aliases. He also continued to invite activists to his crypto parties and he
openly advertised the Oahu Crypto Parties on the Internet until 2013. It certainly was not the
“loose lips sink ships” mind set of the NSA’s Cold War days. It better reflected on what CIA
Deputy Director Morell, who reviewed the situation in 2014 as a member of President Obama’s
NSA Review Committee, described as the NSA’s new “culture of transparency.” Even though the
NSA’s activities were largely walled off to the outside world, he found that the NSA in the post-
Cold War age had encouraged its technical workers to freely discuss challenges that arose in its
computer operations. ‘The idea was to spread knowledge and learn from the successes of others,”
Morell wrote, “but it created an enormous security vulnerability, given the always-existent risk of
an insider committed to stealing secrets.” According to a former intelligence executive, this new
“open culture,” exemplified by largely unrestricted entry to the NSANet by civilian contractors,”
fit the culture of the young civilians on the “geek squads” who now ran the NSA’s computer
networks.

It was remarkable that even in such “open culture “Snowden’s crypto party, TOR station, and
other anti-NSA activities could go unnoticed. After all, ten or so NSA workers attended the first
party it is not unlikely that many of them recognized him as their co-worker. If so, they knew (as
did Sandvik and Mills) that the TOR advocate “Cincinnatus” was Snowden. He had also not been
shy in contacting via email notable enemies of the NSA, such as Jacob Appelbaum, Parker
Higgins and Asher Wolf on behalf of the “Oahu Crypto Party.” If anyone, including the security
staff of the NSA, had been on the lookout for dissident intelligence workers, this well-advertised
gathering, and its organizer, might have been of interest. In 2014, I asked a former top NSA
executive whether such activities on behalf of TOR by a NSA employee would arouse the
attention of the NSA’s own “Q” counterespionage unit. He answered, “Snowden was not a NSA
employee.” As a contract employee of Dell residing in the United States, the NSA could not
legally monitor his private activities or intercept his communication. To do so, would require a
FBI request approved by the FISA court. So Snowden/Cincinnatus was free to operate openly in
recruiting NSA workers, hacktavists and computer buffs for his events. Ironically, adversary
intelligence services searching for disgruntled intelligence workers had no such constraints.

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