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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012)

The pleadings further allege that the relationship between these charities and al-Qaeda’s terrorism was widely known and publicly reported. Throughout the 1990s, numerous media reports and statements by government officials disclosed similar facts, including the terrorist activities of al Haramain, IIRO, and WAMY. JA 2596-97, 4337-38, 7891-94. For example, a major Egyptian newspaper, Rose Al Yusuf, reported in late 1992 “that the IIRO and the Bin Laden Organization in Egypt recruited and *96 sponsored more than 700 Arab operatives to travel to Afghanistan to train as jihadist terrorists.” JA2596. International media reported “that the Cairo office of the IIRO was managed by the bin Laden family and Mohamad Showki Al Istanbul, who was sentenced to death in Egypt for his Islamic extremist activities.” Id. Another newspaper reported that “[t]he IIRO was shut down by Egyptian authorities later in 1993 or early 1994 as a result of the charity’s links to Osama Bin Laden.” Id. An article in Rose Al Yusuf provided:

Working with Palestinian Islamist Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, Bin-Ladin set up the ‘Jihad and Relief’ guesthouse in Peshawar to receive volunteers who would arrive after a short stop in the al-Ansar guesthouse in Jeddah. The route of this process passed through the unlicensed Cairo office of the [MWL], directed by Dr. Abdallah Umar Nasif.

JA2596-97. In addition, public testimony from a high-level al-Qaeda operative prior to September 11, 2001, “described how Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, convicted terrorist and IIRO employee, Jamal Khalifa, opened a [MWL] office in Pakistan for the use of the founders of al Qaeda to recruit, train and equip al Qaeda terrorists.” JA2597.

Moreover, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the defendants were aware of these facts based on their obligation under the Koran to *97 inquire into the source of their zakat and haram donations, many of which went to al-Qaeda front charities. See supra 47-48, 50-51, 81-82, 85, 89-90, 96; JA1070-71. That is, “[t]he Quran requires every Muslim, individuals and corporations, to give Zakat for specific charitable purposes identified in the Quaran.” JA1062. Muslims are also required to donate their haram income, which is money derived from sources such as earned interest or “impure activities such as gambling or the sale of liquor.” JA1063-64. To ensure that their zakat and haram contributions “satisfy their religious obligations under Islam,” entities making the contributions are “required to determine that the ultimate recipients ... fall within one of the categories prescribed in the Quran ....” JA1070.

It is commonplace for courts to infer a defendant’s mental state from surrounding facts when analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“ ‘knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence’ ”) (quoting Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988)); Foster v. Auburn Univ., No. 11-CV-503, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141056, at *11-12 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2011) (finding that factual allegations gave rise to reasonable inference that defendant engaged in intentional conduct); Med- *98 Sys. v. Masterson Mktg., No. 11-CV-695, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135216, at *19-20 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) (same); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 10-CV-1842, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106657, at *12-16 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2011) (same); Redding v. Edwards, 569 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same). Even in the context of criminal prosecutions under Sections 2339A and 2339B, courts have held it proper to infer a defendant’s mental state based on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, No. 09-1560, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24216 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) (finding that “it was logical for the jury to conclude that the defendants’ inten[ded] ... to support Hamas” as “the evidence strongly supported the inference that the defendants were connected to Hamas”); United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1121 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that “there is ample circumstantial evidence of [the defendant’s] knowledge of Al Qaeda and its terrorist activities”); United States v. Kassir, No. 09-CR-356, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83075, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) (finding that evidence “allowed the jury to infer that [the defendant] intended the jihad training to benefit al Qaeda”).

*99 An inference that the defendants possessed the requisite mental state is particularly reasonable where, as here, the plaintiffs allege that the charities supported by the defendants were publicly known to have been involved in terrorist activities and to be affiliated with al-Qaeda. See Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 647-48; see also Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 428-29 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs had “sufficiently pled that the defendant consciously disregarded the fact that it was supporting a terrorist organization” when various forms of public information suggested “that

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