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Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page10 of 24

States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since
Cohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine,
Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four
types of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine:
an order denying a bond, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a
motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate
Clause, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for
trial, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in
which the Supreme Court has “refused to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal
cases have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799.

13. As to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n order is
‘effectively unreviewable’ where ‘the order at issue involves an asserted right the
legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated
before trial.’” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lauro
Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989)). “The justification for
immediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of
deferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558
U.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party “in ways that are only

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