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the whole of Syria is demanding change. The largest cities of Aleppo
and Damascus remain relatively calm, while opinion in western
capitals is led by reports generated via opposition movements, often
using social media of questionable reliability. The army has
committed many atrocities but hundreds of its members appear to
have been killed, too. In the absence of international media, it is
debatable whether the protesters are altogether peaceful.
Already, calls for military intervention are being made by Syrian
opposition activists in meetings at the White House and US state
department. Yet such movements have led us astray before, as when
politicians such as Ahmed Chalabi misled the US about realities in
Iraq. In truth, Mr Assad’s regime is much less likely to fall than that
of Muammer Gaddafi: there have been no high-profile political or
military defections, while Mr Assad remains relatively popular
among senior military commanders, Syrian mosque clerics, the
middle classes and business leaders.
This brings us back to the “then what” question. The numbers being
killed now will wither in comparison with a possible future civil war,
if an increasingly sectarian Syria splinters between the ruling
Alawites, the elite and urban Christians, the majority Sunnis, the
Kurds, Druze and others. There is no civil society to engineer a
peaceful transition, while Syria could plausibly become another
Lebanon, acting as a proxy battleground for regional powers.
This risk partly explains why Syria’s ally Turkey has exerted such
effort to rein in the slaughter, and why Saudi Arabia, Russia and
China have not joined America’s lead. They all want to give Mr
Assad more time – because they recognise the thin chance of getting
rid of him, and because they fear the violence that would follow if he
did fall.
Almost 90 per cent of Syria’s crude oil exports go to European
countries. Almost $3bn of its annual trade is conducted with Turkey.

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