DOJ-OGR-00005399.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 Filed 10/29/21 Page 6 of 54

order) (alterations in original) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)); see
Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (imposing limits on the scope of cross-examination).

In the context of the disclosure of witness identifying information, the Second Circuit has
identified two primary interests of defendants: “(1) obtaining information needed for in-court and
out-of-court investigation of the witness; and (2) enabling defense counsel to elicit information
that might be relevant to the jury’s deliberations as to the credibility or knowledgeability of the
witness.” United States v. Marcus, No. 05 Cr. 457 (ARR), 2007 WL 330388, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 31, 2007) (citing United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir. 1970)) (finding the
defendant’s argument that “the district court’s decision permitting two of the Government’s
witnesses to testify using only their first names and not to disclose their addresses or
employment violated” the defendant’s due process rights to be “without merit” in a sex
trafficking and forced labor case), aff’d, 628 F.3d 36, 45 n.12 (2d Cir. 2010). If the Government
provides a reason to “limit disclosure of identifying information in open court,” the defendant
must “demonstrate a ‘particularized need’ for disclosure . . . which the court weighs against the
risks to the witness.” Id. (citing Marti, 421 F.2d at 1266; United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888,
901 (2d Cir. 1969)); see United States v. Urena, 8 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(permitting an undercover law enforcement officer to testify under a pseudonym, after balancing
the relevant interests); cf. United States v. Cavallaro, 553 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“[W]here the government voices a legitimate concern for a witness’ safety, the trial court must
balance the potential danger to the witness against the need of the defense for the information.”).

5

DOJ-OGR-00005399