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666 KB
Extraction Summary
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People
4
Organizations
2
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal brief / appellate filing
File Size:
666 KB
Summary
This document is a page from an appellate legal brief (Case 22-1426) arguing that the District Court erred in applying the 'Annabi' legal precedent to the Appellant's case. The text argues that the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) originated outside the Second Circuit and should not be subject to its specific legal canons, and further argues that the conduct charged in Count Six falls within the time period covered by the original NPA. The document specifically challenges the USAO-SDNY's charges relative to the 2001-2007 offense period.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Appellant | Defendant/Appellant |
Refers to the defendant in Case 22-1426 (likely Ghislaine Maxwell based on case number and context of NPA arguments).
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| District Court |
The lower court whose decision is being appealed.
|
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| Second Circuit |
The appellate court jurisdiction mentioned regarding legal precedents.
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| USAO-SDNY |
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, which charged the Appellant.
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|
| DOJ-OGR |
Department of Justice - Office of Government Relations (indicated in Bates stamp).
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Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Jurisdiction whose laws are being discussed.
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Location where the NPA originated (implied to be Southern District of Florida).
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Key Quotes (3)
"the District Court did not just purport to follow Annabi, but expanded its questionable doctrine into new and inapplicable territory."Source
DOJ-OGR-00021086.jpg
Quote #1
"it would be unreasonable to graft a unique, pro-prosecution canon of construction... onto a plea agreement negotiated with prosecutors elsewhere."Source
DOJ-OGR-00021086.jpg
Quote #2
"the USAO-SDNY charged Appellant under Count Six with conduct from 2001 through 2004 that falls entirely within the 2001-2007 offense period contemplated by the NPA."Source
DOJ-OGR-00021086.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,564 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page39 of 113
precedent may have been doctrinally flawed, expanding it into “new…context[s]”
would be “a disfavored judicial activity”) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1857, 1859 (2017)). In this case, the District Court did not just purport to
follow Annabi, but expanded its questionable doctrine into new and inapplicable
territory. In this regard, the District Court erred in four respects.
would be “a disfavored judicial activity”) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1857, 1859 (2017)). In this case, the District Court did not just purport to
follow Annabi, but expanded its questionable doctrine into new and inapplicable
territory. In this regard, the District Court erred in four respects.
First, unlike the plea agreement in Annabi, the NPA originated in a federal
district outside of the Second Circuit. Under textbook choice-of-law rules and
principles of fairness, it would be unreasonable to graft a unique, pro-prosecution
canon of construction, derived from the law of a foreign circuit—this circuit—onto
a plea agreement negotiated with prosecutors elsewhere.
district outside of the Second Circuit. Under textbook choice-of-law rules and
principles of fairness, it would be unreasonable to graft a unique, pro-prosecution
canon of construction, derived from the law of a foreign circuit—this circuit—onto
a plea agreement negotiated with prosecutors elsewhere.
Second, Annabi recognized that its “rule concerning construction of plea
agreements” was only “warrant[ed]” when “the new charges are sufficiently
distinct” from the old ones. 771 F.2d at 672. And Annabi made clear that charges
are “sufficiently distinct” when they cover a different or expanded period of time.
Id. But here, the USAO-SDNY charged Appellant under Count Six with conduct
from 2001 through 2004 that falls entirely within the 2001-2007 offense period
contemplated by the NPA. Therefore, Annabi is inapplicable at least as to Count
Six.
agreements” was only “warrant[ed]” when “the new charges are sufficiently
distinct” from the old ones. 771 F.2d at 672. And Annabi made clear that charges
are “sufficiently distinct” when they cover a different or expanded period of time.
Id. But here, the USAO-SDNY charged Appellant under Count Six with conduct
from 2001 through 2004 that falls entirely within the 2001-2007 offense period
contemplated by the NPA. Therefore, Annabi is inapplicable at least as to Count
Six.
Third, Annabi and its predecessors involved situations where there was no
“affirmative” indication whatsoever that the plea agreement was intended to bind
“affirmative” indication whatsoever that the plea agreement was intended to bind
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DOJ-OGR-00021086
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