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567 KB

Extraction Summary

7
People
4
Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal filing / court document (motion or brief)
File Size: 567 KB
Summary

This document is page 67 of a legal filing (Document 397) from Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell), filed on October 29, 2021. The text outlines legal arguments regarding the admissibility of witness identification testimony, citing precedents such as *Neil v. Biggers* and *United States v. Simmons* to argue that even suggestive identification procedures do not require suppression if the identification is independently reliable based on the totality of circumstances. The page bears a Department of Justice footer stamp (DOJ-OGR-00005850).

People (7)

Name Role Context
Maldonado-Rivera Defendant in cited case law
Cited in United States v. Maldonado-Rivera regarding misidentification standards.
Brathwaite Party in cited case law
Cited regarding suppression of identification evidence.
Brisco Party in cited case law
Cited regarding the totality of circumstances in identification.
Simmons Defendant in cited case law
Cited in United States v. Simmons regarding out-of-court identification.
Neil Party in cited case law
Cited in Neil v. Biggers regarding factors for witness reliability.
Biggers Party in cited case law
Cited in Neil v. Biggers regarding factors for witness reliability.
Kelly Party in cited case law
Cited regarding dispositive factors.

Organizations (4)

Name Type Context
United States District Court
Inferred from case number header 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (SDNY).
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Indicated by the Bates stamp DOJ-OGR-00005850.
2d Cir.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, cited in legal precedents.
U.S. Supreme Court
Implied by U.S. citations (e.g., 432 U.S. at 110-14).

Key Quotes (4)

"If the defendant cannot make such a showing, 'the trial identification testimony is generally admissible without further inquiry into the reliability of the pretrial identification.'"
Source
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Quote #1
"Second, an unduly suggestive identification procedure does not alone require suppression of the identification evidence."
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Quote #2
"[E]ven a suggestive out-of-court identification will be admissible if, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, it possesses sufficient indicia of reliability."
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Quote #3
"Among the factors to be considered are: 'the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal...'"
Source
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Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (1,576 characters)

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 67 of 84
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934,
973 (2d Cir. 1990). If the defendant cannot make such a showing, “the trial identification
testimony is generally admissible without further inquiry into the reliability of the pretrial
identification. In that circumstance, any question as to the reliability of the witness’s
identifications goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” Id.
Second, an unduly suggestive identification procedure does not alone require suppression
of the identification evidence. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 110-14. Instead, the court must then
determine whether the identification evidence is nevertheless “independently reliable” based on
the totality of the circumstances. Brisco, 565 F.3d at 89; United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934,
950 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[E]ven a suggestive out-of-court identification will be admissible if, when
viewed in the totality of the circumstances, it possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.”). Among
the factors to be considered are: “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
No single factor is dispositive. See Kelly, 257 F.3d at 135.
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