| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employee |
10
Very Strong
|
10 | |
|
organization
Booz Allen
|
Contractor |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Employment adversarial |
9
Strong
|
4 | |
|
organization
FBI
|
Business associate |
9
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial leaker |
8
Strong
|
4 | |
|
organization
GCHQ
|
Business associate |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
CIA
|
Intelligence sharing |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial breach |
7
|
3 | |
|
person
The President
|
Intelligence provider |
7
|
2 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial |
7
|
3 | |
|
organization
GCHQ
|
Intelligence alliance |
7
|
1 | |
|
person
Rajesh De
|
Employment |
7
|
2 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial employment |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Unknown |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Contractor insider threat |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Richard Ledgett
|
Employee |
6
|
1 | |
|
organization
Booz Allen
|
Client |
6
|
2 | |
|
person
Russian intelligence
|
Espionage target |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial former contractor |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial former employment |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Private Contractors
|
Operational reliance |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Tor Software
|
Adversarial |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Contractor adversary |
6
|
2 | |
|
organization
Department of Defense
|
Organizational subordination |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Edward Snowden
|
Adversarial former contractor |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-01-01 | N/A | Establishment of Cyber Command by NSA and military services. | USA | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA investigation into a potential mole at Fort Meade; no mole found. | Fort Meade | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA security investigation into a leak at Fort Meade | Fort Meade | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA initiated a counterespionage probe at Fort Meade headquarters. | Fort Meade, Maryland | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA security investigation regarding a leak at Fort Meade. | Fort Meade | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | Investigation for a mole at NSA Fort Meade (none found). | Fort Meade | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA security investigation at Fort Meade. | Fort Meade | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA 'Q' division initiates counter-espionage probe at Fort Meade. | Fort Meade, Maryland | View |
| 2010-01-01 | N/A | NSA mole hunt found no mole; Snowden was working in Japan. | Japan/Fort Meade | View |
| 2009-01-01 | N/A | Edward Snowden finds his way into the NSA through a temporary job with an outside contractor. | NSA | View |
| 2009-01-01 | N/A | Snowden obtains temporary job with outside contractor for the NSA. | NSA/Fort Meade | View |
| 2009-01-01 | N/A | Creation of the U.S. Cyber Command. | USA | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | NSA devised technology for tapping into air-gapped computers. | Abroad | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | NSA outsourced the task of reorganizing backup systems at regional bases to Dell. | Regional bases | View |
| 2008-01-01 | N/A | New York Times expose revealing NSA surveillance extended to domestic telephone use. | United States | View |
| 2007-01-01 | N/A | Presidential directive imposing rules on NSA regarding data collection on Americans. | USA | View |
| 2007-01-01 | N/A | NSA found a way to intercept Internet traffic before it was encrypted. | NSA / Internet | View |
| 2001-10-01 | N/A | Congress passes the USA Patriot Act, expanding NSA mandate. | Washington D.C. | View |
| 2001-10-01 | N/A | Congress passes the USA Patriot Act | Washington D.C. | View |
| 1996-01-01 | N/A | Background investigations for the NSA began to be outsourced to private companies. | USA | View |
| 1996-01-01 | N/A | Release of internal NSA report 'Out of Control'. | NSA | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Emergence of computer networks expanding SVR's recruiting horizon. | Global | View |
| 1990-01-01 | N/A | Emergence of computer networks expanding SVR recruiting horizons. | Global / US | View |
| 1980-01-01 | N/A | Issuance of Executive Order 12333 by President Reagan. | USA | View |
| 1980-01-01 | N/A | President Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 expanding NSA interception mandates. | USA | View |
This document appears to be page 208 from a book titled 'How America Lost Its Secrets' (likely by Edward Jay Epstein, indicated by the filename 'Epst_...'), produced as part of a House Oversight investigation. The text discusses the NSA security breach committed by Edward Snowden ('mere analyst in training') in Oahu and references his subsequent presence in Moscow. It analyzes how reliance on outside contractors created a 'back door' for the breach.
| Date | Type | From | To | Amount | Description | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | Received | PRC / US Government | NSA | $12,300,000,000.00 | Annual budget of $12.3 billion mentioned. | View |
| N/A | Received | PRC / US Government | NSA | $0.00 | Reference to a 'multibillion-dollar black budge... | View |
| 1960-01-01 | Received | PRC / US Government | NSA | $0.00 | Multi-billion dollar 'black budget' hidden from... | View |
| 1960-01-01 | Received | PRC / US Government | NSA | $0.00 | Multi-billion dollar 'black budget' hidden from... | View |
Noted requirements for 4,000 periodic investigations to guard against insider threats.
Warned that reliance on outsiders opened a back door into the NSA
Billing records of persons called by known foreign jihadists, supplied to the FBI.
Report citing failures of Russian intelligence and predicting future targeting of insider computer personnel.
Report warning about the security risks posed by system administrators and networked computers.
Analysis of NSA vulnerability suggesting networking computers created a 'precarious basket' and predicting a system administrator could become a mole.
Report assessing NSA vulnerability to penetration, predicting system administrators as a risk.
Report warning that networking computers created a vulnerability where a 'system administrator' could become an insider threat.
Mandate to expand interception of foreign communications.
Mandate to use all means consistent with federal law to obtain reliable intelligence information.
Briefing regarding the extent of data Snowden had taken.
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