Eubanks
PersonRelationship Network
Event Timeline
| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
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location
United States
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Legal representative |
5
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1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979-01-01 | Legal case | United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 | U.S. Court of Appeals for t... | View |
DOJ-OGR-00009147.jpg
This legal document argues against the automatic presumption of juror bias when a juror has engaged in conduct similar to the defendant's. It cites multiple court cases from various circuits (First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth) to support the position that juror removal is reserved for "extreme situations" and that a finding of bias often depends on a combination of factors, not just a similarity of experience. The document distinguishes cases cited by the defendant, arguing they are either inapposite or involve unique, egregious facts not present in the current matter.
DOJ-OGR-00009039.jpg
This legal document, page 38 of a court filing from February 24, 2022, argues that a specific juror, Juror No. 50, should be considered impliedly biased. The argument is supported by citing legal precedent from various cases (Eubanks, Daugerdas, Dyer, Sampson) which establish two main theories for implied bias: when a juror lies during the selection process (voir dire) and when a juror's personal life experiences are too similar to the issues being litigated in the case, potentially compromising their impartiality.
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This document is page vi of a legal filing (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE, Document 613), filed on February 24, 2022. It is a table of authorities, listing numerous legal cases with their citations and the page numbers where they are referenced in the main document. The cases cited span from 1936 to 2018 and involve various parties in different U.S. federal and state courts.
DOJ-OGR-00009826.jpg
This legal document argues against the defendant's assertion that a juror's similar life experiences should automatically presume bias, requiring their removal. It cites multiple legal precedents (from the Second, First, Seventh, and other circuits) to support the position that only "extreme situations" warrant such a presumption. The document contends that similarity of experience is just one of many factors to be considered and is often insufficient on its own to justify a juror's dismissal for cause.
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