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775 KB
Extraction Summary
9
People
11
Organizations
1
Locations
1
Events
0
Relationships
6
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
775 KB
Summary
This legal document argues against the defendant's assertion that a juror's similar life experiences should automatically presume bias, requiring their removal. It cites multiple legal precedents (from the Second, First, Seventh, and other circuits) to support the position that only "extreme situations" warrant such a presumption. The document contends that similarity of experience is just one of many factors to be considered and is often insufficient on its own to justify a juror's dismissal for cause.
People (9)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Torres |
Party in the cited case Torres, 128 F.3d at 46.
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| Allsup |
Party in the Allsup decision from the Ninth Circuit, which was rejected in Torres and relied upon in Eubanks.
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| Eubanks |
Party in the cited case United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979).
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| Skaggs |
Party in the cited case Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18 (10th Cir. 1998).
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| Daugerdas |
Party in the cited case United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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| Parse |
Party in the cited case United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015), which vacated the Daugerdas decision.
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| Sampson |
Party in the cited case Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013).
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| Hunley |
Party in the cited case Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1992).
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| Godinez |
Party in the cited case Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Organizations (11)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ninth Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the source of the Allsup decision and the court in the Eubanks case.
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| Second Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as having binding precedent that is inconsistent with cases cited by the defendant. Also the court in the P...
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| Otis Elevator Co. | company |
Party in the cited case Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co.
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| 10th Cir. | government agency |
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the Skaggs case.
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| S.D.N.Y. | government agency |
The Southern District of New York court, which decided the Daugerdas case.
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| 2d Cir. | government agency |
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the Parse case.
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| First Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the court that declined to rest its decision on a single category of bias in the Sampson case.
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| 1st Cir. | government agency |
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the Sampson case.
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| 7th Cir. | government agency |
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided the Hunley case.
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| United States | government agency |
Party in the cited cases United States v. Eubanks, United States v. Daugerdas, United States v. Parse, and Sampson v....
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| DOJ-OGR | government agency |
Appears in the footer of the document (DOJ-OGR-00009826).
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Timeline (1 events)
Discussion of legal precedent regarding juror bias, specifically whether a juror's similar experience to the defendant's conduct requires a presumption of bias.
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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The location of the court that decided United States v. Daugerdas.
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Key Quotes (6)
"extreme situations"Source
— The document, characterizing case law
(Describing the types of cases that call for mandatory removal of a juror due to presumed bias.)
DOJ-OGR-00009826.jpg
Quote #1
"particular . . . prior experiences were biased"Source
— Ninth Circuit (in Allsup decision)
(Quoted from the Allsup decision, which held that courts must presume bias in jurors with certain prior experiences.)
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Quote #2
"litany of lies"Source
— Unknown (describing a juror's conduct)
(Describing the actions of a juror in a death penalty case cited by the defendant.)
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Quote #3
"taken in isolation, may be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause."Source
— First Circuit (in Sampson v. United States)
(Referring to various factors (like similarity of experience, dishonesty, etc.) that, by themselves, might not be enough to remove a juror.)
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Quote #4
"extreme"Source
— Seventh Circuit (in Hunley v. Godinez)
(Describing a case where two jurors were burglarized during deliberations.)
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Quote #5
"our holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein"Source
— Seventh Circuit (in Hunley v. Godinez)
(A statement from the court in the Hunley case, limiting the applicability of its ruling.)
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Quote #6
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,361 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 28 of 49
also decline to hold as a general matter that, where a juror has
engaged in conduct similar to that of the defendant at trial, the trial
judge must presume bias. Such cases are unlikely to present the
“extreme situations” that call for mandatory removal.
engaged in conduct similar to that of the defendant at trial, the trial
judge must presume bias. Such cases are unlikely to present the
“extreme situations” that call for mandatory removal.
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46; see also id. at 46 & n.11 (rejecting Allsup decision from Ninth Circuit that
court must presume that jurors who had “particular . . . prior experiences were biased”). Thus, to
the extent the cases cited by the defendant purport to require such a presumption of bias, they are
inconsistent with binding Second Circuit precedent. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 31 (citing United
States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979), which relied on Allsup)).
court must presume that jurors who had “particular . . . prior experiences were biased”). Thus, to
the extent the cases cited by the defendant purport to require such a presumption of bias, they are
inconsistent with binding Second Circuit precedent. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 31 (citing United
States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979), which relied on Allsup)).
The remaining cases cited by the defendant are inapposite. Some merely state a general
proposition that similarity of experiences may give rise to a presumption of bias, but then go on to
resolve the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated
by United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). Others find that a juror should have been
struck not merely because of similarity of experiences, but also based on a number of other factors
not present here. For example, in one case prominently cited by the defendant, a juror in the
penalty phase of a death penalty case told a “litany of lies,” and the First Circuit declined to rest
its decision on any particular category of bias, but instead cited the combination of the juror’s
interpersonal relationships, inability to separate emotion from duty, similarity of experiences,
scope and severity of dishonesty, and motive for lying, any one of which “taken in isolation, may
be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Sampson v. United
States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-
20 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing combination of factors in “extreme” case where two jurors were
burglarized during deliberations and then changed their votes as a result, and stating that “our
holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein” and “[i]t is unlikely these rare
proposition that similarity of experiences may give rise to a presumption of bias, but then go on to
resolve the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated
by United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). Others find that a juror should have been
struck not merely because of similarity of experiences, but also based on a number of other factors
not present here. For example, in one case prominently cited by the defendant, a juror in the
penalty phase of a death penalty case told a “litany of lies,” and the First Circuit declined to rest
its decision on any particular category of bias, but instead cited the combination of the juror’s
interpersonal relationships, inability to separate emotion from duty, similarity of experiences,
scope and severity of dishonesty, and motive for lying, any one of which “taken in isolation, may
be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Sampson v. United
States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-
20 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing combination of factors in “extreme” case where two jurors were
burglarized during deliberations and then changed their votes as a result, and stating that “our
holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein” and “[i]t is unlikely these rare
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DOJ-OGR-00009826
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