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775 KB
Extraction Summary
9
People
8
Organizations
1
Locations
1
Events
0
Relationships
6
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
775 KB
Summary
This legal document argues against the automatic presumption of juror bias when a juror has engaged in conduct similar to the defendant's. It cites multiple court cases from various circuits (First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth) to support the position that juror removal is reserved for "extreme situations" and that a finding of bias often depends on a combination of factors, not just a similarity of experience. The document distinguishes cases cited by the defendant, arguing they are either inapposite or involve unique, egregious facts not present in the current matter.
People (9)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Torres | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'Torres, 128 F.3d at 46'.
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| Allsup | Litigant |
Mentioned in the context of the 'Allsup decision from Ninth Circuit' and as a case relied upon in 'United States v. E...
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| Eubanks | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979)'.
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| Skaggs | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18 (10th Cir. 1998)'.
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| Daugerdas | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)'.
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| Parse | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015)' which vacated the Daugerdas decision.
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| Sampson | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013)'.
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| Hunley | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1992)'.
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| Godinez | Litigant |
Cited in the legal case 'Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1992)'.
|
Organizations (8)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ninth Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the source of the 'Allsup decision' and the court for 'United States v. Eubanks'.
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| Second Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned for its 'binding Second Circuit precedent' and as the court for 'United States v. Parse'.
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| Otis Elevator Co. | company |
Cited as a party in the legal case 'Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co.'.
|
| Tenth Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the court for 'Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co.'.
|
| S.D.N.Y. | government agency |
Abbreviation for the Southern District of New York court, mentioned in the citation for 'United States v. Daugerdas'.
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| First Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the court that 'declined to rest its decision on any particular category of bias' in the Sampson case.
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| Seventh Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as the court for 'Hunley v. Godinez'.
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| United States | government agency |
Party in the legal cases 'United States v. Eubanks', 'United States v. Daugerdas', 'United States v. Parse', and 'Sam...
|
Timeline (1 events)
Two jurors were burglarized during deliberations and then changed their votes as a result.
two jurors
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Mentioned in the citation for United States v. Daugerdas, referring to the Southern District of New York.
|
Key Quotes (6)
"extreme situations"Source
— unspecified court
(Describing cases that call for mandatory removal of a juror due to presumed bias.)
DOJ-OGR-00009147.jpg
Quote #1
"particular . . . prior experiences were biased"Source
— Ninth Circuit (in Allsup decision)
(A quote from a rejected Ninth Circuit decision regarding the presumption of bias in jurors.)
DOJ-OGR-00009147.jpg
Quote #2
"litany of lies"Source
— unspecified, describing a juror's testimony
(Describing the actions of a juror in a death penalty case cited by the defendant.)
DOJ-OGR-00009147.jpg
Quote #3
"taken in isolation, may be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause."Source
— First Circuit (in Sampson v. United States)
(Referring to various factors (like dishonesty, motive for lying, etc.) that, individually, might not be enough to remove a juror.)
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Quote #4
"our holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein"Source
— Seventh Circuit (in Hunley v. Godinez)
(A statement from a court decision limiting its applicability to the specific, extreme facts of that case.)
DOJ-OGR-00009147.jpg
Quote #5
"[i]t is unlikely these rare"Source
— Seventh Circuit (in Hunley v. Godinez)
(Part of a statement from a court decision emphasizing the rarity of the case's circumstances.)
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Quote #6
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,367 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 28 of 49
also decline to hold as a general matter that, where a juror has
engaged in conduct similar to that of the defendant at trial, the trial
judge must presume bias. Such cases are unlikely to present the
“extreme situations” that call for mandatory removal.
engaged in conduct similar to that of the defendant at trial, the trial
judge must presume bias. Such cases are unlikely to present the
“extreme situations” that call for mandatory removal.
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46; see also id. at 46 & n.11 (rejecting Allsup decision from Ninth Circuit that
court must presume that jurors who had “particular . . . prior experiences were biased”). Thus, to
the extent the cases cited by the defendant purport to require such a presumption of bias, they are
inconsistent with binding Second Circuit precedent. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 31 (citing United
States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979), which relied on Allsup)).
court must presume that jurors who had “particular . . . prior experiences were biased”). Thus, to
the extent the cases cited by the defendant purport to require such a presumption of bias, they are
inconsistent with binding Second Circuit precedent. (See, e.g., Def. Mem. at 31 (citing United
States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979), which relied on Allsup)).
The remaining cases cited by the defendant are inapposite. Some merely state a general
proposition that similarity of experiences may give rise to a presumption of bias, but then go on to
resolve the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated
by United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). Others find that a juror should have been
struck not merely because of similarity of experiences, but also based on a number of other factors
not present here. For example, in one case prominently cited by the defendant, a juror in the
penalty phase of a death penalty case told a “litany of lies,” and the First Circuit declined to rest
its decision on any particular category of bias, but instead cited the combination of the juror’s
interpersonal relationships, inability to separate emotion from duty, similarity of experiences,
scope and severity of dishonesty, and motive for lying, any one of which “taken in isolation, may
be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Sampson v. United
States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-
20 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing combination of factors in “extreme” case where two jurors were
burglarized during deliberations and then changed their votes as a result, and stating that “our
holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein” and “[i]t is unlikely these rare
proposition that similarity of experiences may give rise to a presumption of bias, but then go on to
resolve the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517-18
(10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated
by United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). Others find that a juror should have been
struck not merely because of similarity of experiences, but also based on a number of other factors
not present here. For example, in one case prominently cited by the defendant, a juror in the
penalty phase of a death penalty case told a “litany of lies,” and the First Circuit declined to rest
its decision on any particular category of bias, but instead cited the combination of the juror’s
interpersonal relationships, inability to separate emotion from duty, similarity of experiences,
scope and severity of dishonesty, and motive for lying, any one of which “taken in isolation, may
be insufficient to ground a finding of a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Sampson v. United
States, 724 F.3d 150, 161, 166-68 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-
20 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing combination of factors in “extreme” case where two jurors were
burglarized during deliberations and then changed their votes as a result, and stating that “our
holding is limited to the very unique facts stated herein” and “[i]t is unlikely these rare
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