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| 1975-01-01 | Legal ruling | The Third Circuit, in U.S. v. Richardson, rejected the retroactive application of a criminal stat... | N/A | View |
This document is an excerpt from a legal analysis discussing the interpretation of statutory language, specifically § 3283, and the application of 'categorical' versus 'circumstance-specific' approaches in legal contexts. It references several court cases including United States v. Schneider (2015), Weingarten (865 F.3d at 58), United States v. Morgan (2004), and Nijhawan v. Holder (2009), to support the argument that courts should look beyond bare legal charges to the circumstances of an offense, especially when a statute uses the word 'involves'.
This document is an excerpt from a legal report discussing a circuit split regarding federal criminal law, specifically the binding nature of plea agreement promises made by United States Attorneys. It details how the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits apply 'Santobello's instruction' that such promises bind the government, citing the Third Circuit's ruling in United States v. Gebbie (2002) and the Fourth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Carter (1972) to explain that U.S. Attorneys' commitments bind the entire federal government.
This document is page 2 of a court order filed on September 2, 2020, in case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN. The court denies the defendant's request to modify a protective order that was previously entered on July 30, 2020. The court's decision is based on the original agreement between the parties, which stipulated that discovery materials provided by the government would be used solely for the defense of the current criminal case and not for any civil proceedings.
This legal document argues that the trial court improperly denied bail to Ghislaine Maxwell by relying on the government's proffer, which was based on an indictment. The author contends that an indictment is merely an accusation and not evidence, citing legal precedent and pattern jury instructions from the Third Circuit to support this claim. The document asserts that the court should order Maxwell's release.
This document is a page from a legal filing in a criminal case against an individual named Maxwell. The court analyzes and ultimately rejects Maxwell's argument that a 'categorical approach' should be used to interpret the statutes related to the charges. The court relies on precedent from the Second and Third Circuits, particularly the reasoning in *Weingarten v. United States*, to conclude that the categorical approach is not applicable in this context.
This legal document presents an argument against Maxwell's interpretation of Section 3283 of the U.S. Code. The author refutes Maxwell's claim that the phrase "offense involving" requires a narrow, elements-based analysis, citing precedents like *Weingarten* and *Nijhawan* to support a broader, circumstance-specific approach. The document distinguishes the cases cited by Maxwell by arguing they involved different statutory language, specifically definitions of a "crime of violence," which are not present here.
This legal document argues that the District Court's application of statute § 3283 is improper because it creates "impermissible retroactive effects" without explicit authorization from Congress. The author cites several legal precedents, including Landgraf and U.S. v. Richardson, to support the established legal principle against the retroactive application of statutes, particularly criminal statutes of limitations. The document contends that because clear congressional intent for retroactivity is absent, the District Court's decision must be reversed.
This legal document argues that a District Court's interpretation of statute § 3283 is flawed because it relies on misinterpreted legal precedent. The author contends the court, following a Third Circuit opinion, improperly applied a quote from the *Dodge* case, which concerned a different statute (SORNA), to invent a legislative history for § 3283 that does not exist.
This document is page 19 of a legal brief filed on September 16, 2020, likely by the prosecution or a respondent opposing an appeal by Ghislaine Maxwell. The text argues that the cases Maxwell cited in her notice of appeal are irrelevant ('inapposite') because they deal with third-party intervenors (like the press or the CFTC) seeking to modify protective orders, whereas Maxwell is a direct party to the case. It specifically distinguishes the current situation from *Brown v. Maxwell* and other precedents regarding appellate jurisdiction over protective orders.
This document is a court order denying the Defendant's request to modify a protective order in a criminal case. The original order, entered on July 30, 2020, restricted the use of discovery materials provided by the Government solely for the defense of the current criminal action. The court's decision upholds this restriction, preventing the Defendant from using the documents for any other purpose.
This document is a transcript of a legal argument in court. A lawyer is addressing a judge ('your Honor') about whether a mistake made by a 'Mr. Parse' constituted defrauding the government. The core of the argument revolves around a juror's note written by Catherine Conrad and whether it can be used to infer prejudice, with the lawyer citing Rule 606(b) and a Third Circuit case to argue against its use for that purpose.
This legal document, a page from a court filing, presents an argument against a defendant's motion. The author contends that Section 3283, concerning sexual abuse offenses, should be interpreted broadly, citing precedents like 'Vickers' and 'Schneider'. The document argues that the defendant's reliance on the 'essential ingredients' test from 'Bridges v. United States' is misplaced because that case dealt with a different, more narrowly drafted statute (the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act) and is therefore inapplicable.
This legal document, filed on May 25, 2021, is a legal argument concerning the scope of plea agreements across different federal judicial districts. The author argues, based on Second Circuit precedent like Annabi, that a plea agreement from one district does not bind another unless explicitly stated. The document contrasts this with a broader interpretation from the Third Circuit (in United States v. Gebbie), which the defendant in the current case (Maxwell) is urging the court to adopt.
This document is page 54 of 78 from a submission to the House Oversight Committee, bearing the name of Epstein's attorney, David Schoen. The content is a reproduction of a 2007 Utah Law Review article discussing the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), specifically focusing on victim impact statements, sentencing guidelines, and the split between different Circuit courts regarding notice requirements for upward departures in sentencing. This legal context is highly relevant to the Epstein case, as the violation of CVRA rights (failure to notify victims of the plea deal) was a central point of contention in the scrutiny of his Non-Prosecution Agreement.
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