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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page60 of 93

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Maxwell first relies on Section 3283’s use of the phrase “offense involving” the sexual abuse of a child, which, she contends, “dictates” looking only to the elements of the offense. (Br.43). But as this Court has already recognized, Section 3283’s text “reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct ‘involv[ed] in the offense’”—a “linguistic expansion” that shows Congress’s intent for “courts to look beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether § 3283 applied.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59-60; see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (holding that a statute that includes an “offense . . . involves” phrase is “consistent with a circumstance-specific approach”). Indeed, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected an “‘essential ingredient’ test” comparable to the categorical approach and instead applied case-specific analysis to determine that Section 3283 applied to travel with intent to commit an illegal sex act with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196-97.

Maxwell also argues that “the clear weight of authority” holds that statutes employing similar language “should be read through a categorical rather than case-specific lens.” (Br.44-45). But the decisions she cites involved statutes with other features favoring the categorical approach, which are notably absent here. Some cases involved statutes that defined a “crime of violence” as an offense that either “has as an element” the use of physical force or “by its nature” involves a substantial risk of force—language that invokes an elements-based approach. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328-29 (2019); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004). Some cases concerned the

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