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830 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

leged conduct is sufficiently extreme and
outrageous enough to permit recovery.
Stuto, at 827. The attacks on September
11, 2001 were undoubtedly extreme and
outrageous. The Court finds that if the
Ashton and Burnett Plaintiffs’s allegations
sufficiently allege that Defendants sup-
ported, aided and abetted, or conspired
with the September 11 terrorists, they will
have also stated a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See Bur-
nett I, 274 F.Supp.2d at 107–08 (analyzing
claims under New York law).

7. Trespass

[85] The Federal Plaintiffs bring a
claim for trespass on the theory that De-
fendants assisted and encouraged those
who intentionally entered the World Trade
Center property. New York courts de-
scribe this cause of action as “the interfer-
ence with a person’s right to possession of
real property either by an unlawful act or
a lawful act performed in an unlawful man-
ner.” N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir.1989)
(citing Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349,
352, 497 N.Y.S.2d 326, 488 N.E.2d 72
(1985)). To the extent that the Federal
Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that Defen-
dants acted in concert with the September
11 hijackers, they may proceed with this
claim. Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of
New York, 01 Civ. 10137(LAK), 2003 WL
22862646, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3., 2003)
(citing Pittman, 149 F.3d at 122–23).

8. Negligence

[86–88] In New York, a plaintiff may
establish negligent infliction of emotional
distress under the bystander or direct
duty theory. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d
415, 421 (2d Cir.2000). Under the by-
stander theory, “a defendant’s conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such

conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about injuries to the plaintiff in conse-
quence of shock or fright resulting from
his or her contemporaneous observation of
serious physical injury or death inflicted
by the defendant’s conduct on a member of
the plaintiff’s immediate family in his or
her presence.” Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61
N.Y.2d 219, 223–24, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 461
N.E.2d 843 (1984). Under the direct duty
theory, a plaintiff suffers emotional dis-
tress caused by “defendant’s breach of a
duty which unreasonably endangered
[plaintiff’s] own physical safety.” Mortise
v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d
Cir.1996).

[89–92] To establish a claim for negli-
gence under New York law, “a plaintiff
must show that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a cognizable duty of care, that the
defendant breached that duty, and that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate
cause of that breach.” King v. Crossland
Savings Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir.
1997). The most basic element of a negli-
gence claim is the existence of a duty owed
to plaintiffs by defendants. Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342,
162 N.E. 99 (1928); see also Burnett I, 274
F.Supp.2d at 108 (dismissing negligence
claims against Defendant Al Haramain Is-
lamic Foundation because complaint failed
to allege or identify any duty owed to
Plaintiffs). Banks do not owe non-custom-
ers a duty to protect them from the inten-
tional torts of their customers. Renner v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ.
926(CSH), 1999 WL 47239, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999) (citing cases);
Burnett I, 274 F.Supp.2d at 109 (“Plaintiffs
offer no support, and we have found none,
for the proposition that a bank is liable for
injuries done with money that passes
through its hands in the form of deposits,
withdrawals, check clearing services, or
any other routine banking service.”). The

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