DOJ-OGR-00003106.jpg
765 KB
Extraction Summary
7
People
2
Organizations
2
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
765 KB
Summary
This legal document is a portion of a court filing, likely from the prosecution, arguing against a defendant's motion. The prosecution asserts that the defendant's false statements, made in a civil deposition, were intended to obstruct a criminal investigation by the FBI and a grand jury, and are therefore connected to the substantive offenses. The argument cites several legal precedents to support the claim that the charges should not be severed.
People (7)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Brown | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL 161146'.
|
| Martinez | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839'.
|
| Ruiz | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505'.
|
| Potamitis | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791'.
|
| Carson | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436'.
|
| Sweig | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19'.
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| Broccolo | Party in a legal case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190'.
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| FBI | government agency |
Mentioned as a potential target of an attempt to derail an investigation: '...rather than “to the grand jury or the F...
|
| Boies Schiller | company |
Recipient of a grand jury subpoena: '...grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller...'
|
Timeline (3 events)
The defendant made false statements during a civil deposition.
defendant
The defendant filed motions to suppress the fruits of a grand jury subpoena.
defendant
Relationships (2)
The document alleges the defendant made false statements to 'derail its investigation'.
defendant
→
adversarial
→
grand jury
The document alleges the defendant made false statements to derail the grand jury's investigation and filed motions to suppress a grand jury subpoena.
Key Quotes (5)
"isolated"Source
— Court in United States v. Brown
(Describing a firearms possession charge that was severed from other charges.)
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Quote #1
"to the grand jury or the FBI to derail its investigation."Source
— defendant (as quoted in the document)
(The defendant's contention regarding where her false statements were made and their purpose.)
DOJ-OGR-00003106.jpg
Quote #2
"flatly rejected"Source
— defendant (as quoted in the document)
(Describing the defendant's rejection of a law enforcement exception to a civil protective order.)
DOJ-OGR-00003106.jpg
Quote #3
"declined to invoke"Source
— defendant (as quoted in the document)
(Describing the defendant's decision not to use her Fifth Amendment privilege at a deposition.)
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Quote #4
"concern the substantive offenses"Source
— Court in a cited case
(A legal standard for affirming the denial of a severance motion, where false statements relate to the main charges.)
DOJ-OGR-00003106.jpg
Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,284 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 172 of 239
in each indictment—to his personal profit); United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL 161146, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (severing an “isolated” firearms possession charge on a certain day from other narcotics and firearms charges); United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839 (SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) (similar).
The defendant also contends that her false statements were not connected to the substantive offenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than “to the grand jury or the FBI to derail its investigation.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the defendant’s own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller, the defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal investigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the distinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant “flatly rejected” a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing that the defendant “declined to invoke” her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment that distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which turns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and is thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker’s effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements “concern the substantive offenses” and citing cases where the perjury count’s proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With respect to that analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement
The defendant also contends that her false statements were not connected to the substantive offenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than “to the grand jury or the FBI to derail its investigation.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the defendant’s own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller, the defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal investigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the distinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant “flatly rejected” a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing that the defendant “declined to invoke” her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment that distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which turns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and is thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker’s effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements “concern the substantive offenses” and citing cases where the perjury count’s proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With respect to that analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement
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