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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 831
Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

complaints presently before the Court do
not allege or identify a duty owed to Plain-
tiffs by moving Defendants. See Burnett
I, 274 F.Supp.2d at 108–09. Accordingly,
the negligence and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims are dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

B. Analysis of Claims Against the
Moving Defendants

[93] While applying the liberal notice
pleading requirements of Rule 8, the Court
notes that in light of “the extreme nature
of the charge of terrorism, fairness re-
quires extra-careful scrutiny of Plaintiffs’
allegations as to any particular defendant,
to ensure that he-or it-does indeed have
fair notice of [the claims].” Id. at 103–04.

1. Al Rajhi Bank

[94] Al Rajhi Bank was founded in
1987 and now has a network of nearly 400
branch offices throughout Saudi Arabia
and seventeen worldwide subsidiaries.
Burnett Complaint ¶ 84. All the banking
Defendants are alleged to have “provided
essential support to the al Qaeda organiza-
tion and operations. The banking Defen-
dants in this lawsuit have acted as instru-
ments of terror, in raising, facilitating and
transferring money to terrorist organiza-
tions.” Burnett Complaint ¶ 46. Plaintiffs
claim that Al Rajhi Bank is “the primary
bank for a number of charities that serve
as al Qaeda front groups,” including Al
Haramain, MWL, WAMY, SJRC, and
IIRO. Burnett Complaint ¶ 85; Rule 12(e)
Statement ¶ 31. “Al Rajhi continues to
maintain Al Haramain’s accounts despite
Al Haramain’s designation on March 11,
2002 as terrorist organizations by both the
United States and Saudi Arabian authori-
ties.” Rule 12(e) Statement ¶ 44. The
Burnett Plaintiffs claim Al Rajhi Bank
knew or had to know that its depositors,
Defendant charities WAMY, MWL, IIRC,

and SJRC were material supporters of
terrorism. Rule 12(e) Statement ¶¶ 44–60.

The Burnett Plaintiffs claim that Saudi
Arabia has “ineffective and/or rudimentary
bank supervisory, anti-money laundering
laws and anti-terrorist financing in place.”
Rule 12(e) Statement ¶¶ 72–78. In 1999,
William Weschler of the National Security
Council and Richard Newcomb of the Of-
fice of Foreign Assets Control traveled to
Saudi Arabia to warn Al Rajhi Bank and
its regulator, the Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency (“SAMA”), “that their financial
systems were being manipulated or uti-
lized to fund terrorist organizations such
as Al Qaeda.” Id. ¶ 75. The United
States encouraged SAMA to adopt “know
your customer” rules. Id. “Despite these
warnings, Al Rajhi failed to adopt even the
most minimal standards, [which] resulted
in the use of Al Rajhi as an instrument of
terror and a material supporter, aider and
abettor of al Qaeda and international ter-
rorist activities.” Id. ¶¶ 76–77.

One of the hijackers on board American
Airlines Flight 11, Abdulaziz al-Omari,
held an account at Al Rajhi Bank. Burnett
Complaint ¶ 85; Rule 12(e) Statement ¶ 43.
Another hijacker, Mohammed Atta, made
a transfer to this account at some time.
Rule 12(e) Statement ¶ 43. Plaintiffs claim
al Qaeda financier Zouaydi asked Abdullah
bin Abdul Muhsen al Turki, a counselor to
the government of Saudi Arabia, to send
money through Al Rajhi. Burnett Com-
plaint ¶¶ 388, 538.

The Burnett Plaintiffs also claim that Al
Rajhi Bank has relationships with Hamas
and other terrorists. Rule 12(e) Statement
¶¶ 61–69. Al Rajhi Bank chose Tex-
as-based Infocom to host its website. Id.
¶¶ 65, 66. Infocom has provided funding
to Hamas and is owned and operated by
Hamas leader and designated terrorist,
Mousa Marzook. Id. There have been
transfers made to Marzook and Infocom

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