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Promote Integrity

Be Alert to Risks The primary risk is of inappropriate influence over admissions,
course content, and program activities stemming from the influence of Chinese
government-linked donors, diplomatic missions, student groups, and institutions.
This is not a new challenge for US university administrators and development officers.
They have dealt with political quid pro quos from donors from South Korea, Taiwan,
Japan, Israel, Russia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the past and
currently, and American universities have long learned how to refuse donations with
strings attached. This historical experience and the existing safeguards should also
help inform and guide US universities when it comes to dealing with this new wave of
Chinese money. Faculty and administrators must continue to protect the open debate,
diversity of opinion, freedom of expression, faculty autonomy, and transparency on
which the health and reputation of their institutions are based. Funding from Chinese
sources should be as welcome as funding from other sources, but only to the extent
that fundamental academic values can be maintained and protected.

A second risk is a loss of sensitive or proprietary technology through academic
instruction of cooperation. There are indications that the US government is now
strengthening measures to protect the theft of sensitive technology and intellectual
property that is being developed on US campuses. These measures may require
heightened screening and, in some cases, outright denial of visas to individuals from
certain state-run institutions or even from certain sensitive research fields. Such
calls have understandably prompted concern from the academic community fearing
that this will undermine the principles of academic freedom, hinder collaboration,
and deny American universities access to a rich talent pool. These reservations are
merited and require that any tightening of visa categories be as narrow as possible.
For their part, universities will of course have to comply with whatever regulations are
imposed. They should, additionally, proactively review and update their procedures
for protecting both proprietary and classified research. They should also enter into
far closer collegial discussions with one another, relevant professional associations,
and government agencies to collectively refine solutions to the difficult problem of
balancing the pursuit of innovation and academic freedom with preventing the theft
of technology and other IP.

To meet these challenges, American universities may need to update their rules and
intensify faculty and researcher training and institutional oversight for protection of
proprietary research information. Some US universities refuse to accept contracts for
classified research. Those that do accept such contracts must comply with government
regulations for the protection of research findings. But all research universities
conduct research that produces valuable intellectual property, which is proprietary
in various proportions to the funder. And so, it is necessary for the university and

Universities
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