This document is a handwritten legal argument filed in court on October 12, 2021, challenging a court's interpretation of statute §3283. The author argues that the statute's legislative history, originating from the 1986 Sexual Abuse Act, demonstrates its narrow purpose is for sexual assault and related offenses, not a broader application. The argument cites several legal cases (Davis, Pledges, Bridges) to contend that the court's findings are 'patently wrong'.
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Davis |
Referenced in a Supreme Court case, 'In Davis (see brief) the Supreme Court found...'
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| Pledges |
Referenced in a SORNA case, '...no reason to use Pledges (SORNA)...'
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| Bridges |
Referenced in a case involving fraud, '...to difference Bridges (offense involving fraud)...'
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| Morgan |
Cited from Maxwell's brief, 'Morgan (cited from Maxwell's brief) is highly relevant...'
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| Maxwell |
Author of a brief from which Morgan is cited, '...Morgan (cited from Maxwell's brief)...'
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| Toussic V |
Referenced as a legal case citation, 'See Toussic V.'
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| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Congress | government agency |
Mentioned in relation to the legislative history of §3283: '...goes far beyond Congress raising the limitation period...
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| Supreme Court | government agency |
Mentioned as having made a finding in the Davis case: 'In Davis (see brief) the Supreme Court found...'
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| the government | government agency |
Mentioned in a parenthetical comment: '(not that the government would have any respect for truth)'
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"conduct involved"Source
"offense involving"Source
"no other statute of limitation shall preclude..."Source
Complete text extracted from the document (1,186 characters)
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