DOJ-OGR-00009146.jpg
767 KB
Extraction Summary
9
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
1
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
767 KB
Summary
This legal document, part of a court filing, argues against a finding of implied bias for 'Juror 50'. It outlines the Second Circuit's established 'narrow' view on the matter, citing multiple precedents where the court refused to presume bias based on occupational relationships or personal experiences without a showing of actual prejudice. The document asserts that the current circumstances involving Juror 50 do not meet the high threshold for mandatory disqualification set by the Second Circuit.
People (9)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Juror 50 | Juror |
Mentioned as the subject of an argument regarding implied bias due to personal experiences and a past business relati...
|
| Torres | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'Torres, 128 F.3d' to support the argument about the Second Circuit's view on implied bias.
|
| Brown | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101'.
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| Allsup | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68'.
|
| Mikus | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719'.
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| Garcia | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648'.
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| Curry | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63'.
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| Lynch | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63'.
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| Greer | Party in a cited case |
Cited in the case 'Greer, 285 F.3d at 172'.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
Referenced throughout the document for its legal precedents and "narrow" view on implied juror bias.
|
| Ninth Circuit | government agency |
Mentioned as having a precedent that the Second Circuit declined to follow regarding the excusal of bank tellers as j...
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| United States | government agency |
Named as a party in several cited legal cases, such as 'United States v. Brown'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
1981
The Second Circuit declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent in the case United States v. Brown.
Second Circuit
Relationships (1)
Juror
→
business
→
defense counsel
The document cites a case (Curry v. Lynch) where an argument was rejected that a juror had implied bias because 'he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel'.
Key Quotes (1)
"consistently refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice."Source
— Second Circuit
(Quoted from the 'Torres' case to describe the Second Circuit's 'narrow' view of implied bias.)
DOJ-OGR-00009146.jpg
Quote #1
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,310 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 27 of 49
Keeping with that “narrow” view of implied bias, the Second Circuit has “consistently
refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause
due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly
on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.”
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has
declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers
as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1981)
(declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United
States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror’s prior service at a
trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness
does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had
implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).
refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause
due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly
on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.”
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has
declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers
as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1981)
(declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United
States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror’s prior service at a
trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness
does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had
implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).
Here, there is no suggestion that Juror 50 is related to a party in this case, or that he is a
victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, the
circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second
Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory
presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.
victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, the
circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second
Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory
presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.
The defendant principally argues that implied bias should be found based on alleged
similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def.
Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding
of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:
similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def.
Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding
of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:
Just as we have refused to carve out an overly broad category of
presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we
presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we
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DOJ-OGR-00009146
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