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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005)
10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789

of this Court [that] has already entertained and rejected
the same constitutional challenge to the same
[governmental] provision.” Id. at 195 (limiting holding to
constitutional challenges to governmental provisions).

NCB’s reliance on Bush cannot prevail here. The
exception relied on in Bush is limited to constitutional
challenges to governmental provisions. Bush, 304 F.3d at
195; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 1003.
Here, the merits of NCB’s liability for the attacks of
September 11 do not present a constitutional challenge to
a governmental provision such that skipping the
jurisdiction question would be appropriate.

In its alternative argument for reconsideration, NCB
requests that the Court postpone resolution of the subject
matter jurisdiction question posed by the FSIA until
NCB’s personal jurisdiction defense is resolved. NCB
argues that such a course would lead to its quicker
dismissal from the litigation and would limit the intrusion
into Saudi affairs since personal jurisdiction discovery
would involve only NCB’s contacts with the United
States and not Saudi Arabia’s relationship to NCB.

The Supreme Court and Second Circuit agree that there
are certain circumstances in which it is appropriate to give
priority to the personal jurisdiction inquiry. See Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 588, 119
S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (holding “there is no
unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy ... [and] there are
circumstances in which a district court appropriately
accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry” and
finding no abuse of discretion where a court resolves a
straightforward personal jurisdiction question before a
novel subject matter jurisdiction question); Cantor
Fitzgerald v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.1996)
(upholding district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction before considering whether it had
subject matter jurisdiction and finding “[o]n some
occasions ... considerations of judicial economy and
restraint may persuade the court to avoid a difficult
question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the case may
be disposed of on a simpler *575 ground”). Further,
deference to foreign sovereigns under the FSIA “need not
imply priority of immunity determination.... If one (or
more) of the other jurisdictional defenses hold out the
promise of being cheaply decisive, and the defendant
wants it decided first, it may well be best to grapple with
it (or them) first.” In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d
247, 254 (D.C.Cir.1998).

[46] Here, the Court finds that the personal jurisdiction
issue raised by NCB is “straightforward” when compared
to the more “difficult” subject matter jurisdiction question

posed by NCB’s status within the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588, 119 S.Ct. 1563; see
also Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 789–792
(analyzing NCB’s status as a foreign sovereign).
Additionally, NCB acknowledges that personal
jurisdiction discovery will only involve it, its relationship
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is sufficiently remote that
an inquiry into NCB’s contacts with the United States will
not intrude on the inner workings of the Kingdom’s
government. Finally, discovery regarding NCB’s FSIA
defense would necessarily subject the Kingdom to
discovery, which the Court is hesitant to do unnecessarily.
See First City, Texas–Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank,
150 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1998); see also Arriba Ltd. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir.1992)
(recommending that “discovery should be ordered
circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific
facts crucial to an immunity determination”).

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court reconsiders its
order regarding simultaneous subject matter and personal
jurisdiction discovery. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (“[I]n
light of [defendant’s] introduction of additional relevant
case law ... we cannot say that reconsider[ation is] an
abuse of discretion.”). Further inquiry into NCB’s status
as a foreign sovereign is postponed until the parties have
completed their personal jurisdiction discovery and this
Court has determined whether it has personal jurisdiction
over NCB. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588, 119 S.Ct. 1563;
In re Arbitration Between Monegasque De Reasurrances
S.A.M., 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d Cir.2002) (noting
“dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is independent
of the merits and does not require subject-matter
jurisdiction”) (quoting In re Minister Papandreou, 139
F.3d at 255–56).

V. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, SHC’s motion to
dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted. Prince
Salman’s motion to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and
Federal complaints for lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction is granted. Prince Naif’s motion to
dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction is granted.
Rabita Trust’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and
Federal complaints are denied without prejudice. Wa’el
Jalaidan’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and
Federal complaints are denied, but the RICO, TVPA,
negligence, and Federal intentional tort claims against
him are dismissed. IIRO’s motions to dismiss the Ashton,

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