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69a
in many cases." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-63, at 54
(2003). For example, a person who abducted and raped
a child could not be prosecuted beyond this extended
limit-even if DNA matching conclusively identified
him as the perpetrator one day after the victim turned
25." Id.
Maxwell makes no argument based on the statute's
text. Instead, she contends that because the House
version of the bill included an express retroactivity
provision absent from its final form, the Court should
infer that Congress did not intend the statute to apply
to past conduct. However, the legislative history makes
clear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity
provision in the House bill only because it would have
produced unconstitutional results. The Supreme Court
has explained that a law that revives a time-barred
prosecution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution, but a law that extends an un-expired
statute of limitations does not. Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who
cosponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in
a committee report that the proposed retroactivity
provision was "of doubtful constitutionality" because it
"would have revived the government's authority to
prosecute crimes that were previously time-barred."
149 Cong. Rec. S5137, S5147 (Apr. 10, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). Congress removed the
provision shortly thereafter for this reason. The
removal of the express retroactivity provision shows
only that Congress intended to limit the PROTECT
Act to its constitutional applications, including past
conduct-like Maxwell's-on which the statute of
limitations had not yet expired.
Both the text and history of the PROTECT Act's
amendment to § 3283 reflect that it applies Maxwell's
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