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Extraction Summary
9
People
2
Organizations
0
Locations
3
Events
1
Relationships
1
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
767 KB
Summary
This legal document, part of a court filing, argues against excusing 'Juror 50' for implied bias. It heavily cites Second Circuit precedent, which maintains a 'narrow' view on the matter, requiring more than just similar personal experiences or occupational relationships to presume bias. The document asserts that the circumstances of Juror 50 do not meet the high threshold for mandatory disqualification established by the court.
People (9)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Torres | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case Torres, 128 F.3d at 46, regarding the Second Circuit's view on implied bias.
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| Brown | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, where the Second Circuit declined to excuse two bank tellers ...
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| Allsup | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, a Ninth Circuit precedent that the Second Circuit declined to...
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| Mikus | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, which had a similar holding to the Brown case.
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| Garcia | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, regarding a juror's prior service.
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| Curry | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, regarding a juror who had a business relationship with defense cou...
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| Lynch | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, regarding a juror who had a business relationship with defense cou...
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| Juror 50 | Juror |
The subject of the legal argument, whom the defendant argues should be excused for implied bias based on personal exp...
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| Greer | Party in a lawsuit |
Cited in the case Greer, 285 F.3d at 172, as an example of rare circumstances for mandatory bias.
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Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
The U.S. Court of Appeals whose precedent is being cited throughout the document as having a 'narrow' view of implied...
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| Ninth Circuit | government agency |
The U.S. Court of Appeals whose precedent in the Allsup case the Second Circuit declined to follow.
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Timeline (3 events)
Relationships (1)
Juror in Curry v. Lynch
→
business
→
Defense Counsel in Curry v. Lynch
The document cites the case Curry v. Lynch, where an argument for implied bias was rejected even though a juror owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel.
Key Quotes (1)
"consistently refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice."Source
— Second Circuit
(Quoted from the Torres case to describe the Second Circuit's 'narrow' view on implied bias for jurors.)
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Quote #1
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,310 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 27 of 49
Keeping with that “narrow” view of implied bias, the Second Circuit has “consistently
refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause
due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly
on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.”
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has
declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers
as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981)
(declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United
States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror’s prior service at a
trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness
does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had
implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).
refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause
due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly
on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.”
Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has
declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers
as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981)
(declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United
States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror’s prior service at a
trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness
does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had
implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).
Here, there is no suggestion that Juror 50 is related to a party in this case, or that he is a
victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, the
circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second
Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory
presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.
victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, the
circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second
Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory
presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.
The defendant principally argues that implied bias should be found based on alleged
similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def.
Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding
of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:
similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def.
Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding
of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:
Just as we have refused to carve out an overly broad category of
presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we
presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we
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