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817 KB

Extraction Summary

9
People
4
Organizations
3
Locations
4
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Legal opinion / court order (exhibit)
File Size: 817 KB
Summary

This document is Page 2 of a 2010 New York court decision (Slip Op. 09090) regarding the suspension of attorney Catherine M. Conrad. The text details her suspension due to alcohol dependency and mental infirmity, denying her immediate reinstatement but converting her suspension to medical grounds. While part of a larger filing (Case 1:20-cv-03388-PAE) likely related to the Epstein/Maxwell litigation, this specific page serves as a legal precedent or exhibit regarding attorney conduct and fitness.

People (9)

Name Role Context
Catherine M. Conrad Respondent
Attorney suspended from practice due to alcohol dependency and failure to cooperate.
Alan W. Friedberg Chief Counsel
Representative for the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Petitioner).
Kevin E.F. O'Sullivan Of Counsel
Representative for the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Petitioner).
Victor M. Serby Attorney
Counsel for the respondent (Conrad).
David B. Saxe Justice Presiding
Judge presiding over the case.
David Friedman Justice
Judge on the case.
John W. Sweeny, Jr. Justice
Judge on the case.
Eugene Nardelli Justice
Judge on the case.
James M. McGuire Justice
Judge on the case.

Organizations (4)

Name Type Context
Departmental Disciplinary Committee
Petitioner seeking suspension of the respondent.
New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division
Implied court issuing the slip opinion.
Thomson Reuters
Copyright holder of the document format.
US Department of Justice
Referenced in footer stamp (DOJ-OGR).

Timeline (4 events)

December 18, 2007
Court suspended respondent from practice of law for failure to respond to requests.
New York
January 26, 2000
Catherine M. Conrad admitted to the practice of law.
New York
May 2010
Re-evaluation of respondent obtained.
New York
November 2009
Psychiatric evaluation of respondent obtained.
New York

Locations (3)

Location Context
Jurisdiction of the legal proceedings.
Location where respondent maintained office.
Location where respondent was admitted to practice.

Relationships (1)

Petitioner vs Respondent in a disciplinary hearing.

Key Quotes (3)

"Based upon respondent's admitted problem with alcohol dependency, which she acknowledged was connected to her failure to cooperate and the underlying conduct..."
Source
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Quote #1
"The psychiatrist determined that respondent's prognosis is good, but did not go as far as to assert that she is now fit to re-commence the practice of law."
Source
DOJ-OGR-00010124.jpg
Quote #2
"respondent is suspended from the practice of law for an indefi-"
Source
DOJ-OGR-00010124.jpg
Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (4,188 characters)

Case 1:20-cv-03388-PAE Document 646-20 Filed 03/24/22 Page 26 of 17
A-5841
Page 2
80 A.D.3d 168, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 09090
(Cite as: 80 A.D.3d 168, 913 N.Y.S.2d 187)
mental health provider attesting to attorney's current fitness to re-commence practice of law was necessary.
N.Y.Ct.Rules, §§ 603.16(c)(1), (f).
**188 Alan W. Friedberg, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Kevin E.F. O'Sullivan,
of counsel), for petitioner.
Victor M. Serby, for respondent.
DAVID B. SAXE, Justice Presiding, DAVID FRIEDMAN, JOHN W. SWEENY, JR., EUGENE NARDELLI,
JAMES M. McGUIRE, Justices.
PER CURIAM.
*169 Respondent Catherine M. Conrad was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Se-
cond Judicial Department on January 26, 2000, and, at all times relevant to this proceeding, has maintained an office
for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.
In a previous order dated December 18, 2007, this Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for fail-
ure to respond to requests made by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee pursuant to its investigation of two
complaints made against her (22 NYCRR 603.4[e][1][i] ). After receiving a response by respondent six months later
seeking an opportunity to respond to the complaints, the Committee conducted an investigation. Based upon re-
spondent's admitted problem with alcohol dependency, which she acknowledged was connected to her failure to
cooperate and the underlying conduct, the Committee obtained a psychiatric evaluation of respondent in November
2009, and a subsequent re-evaluation in May 2010. The psychiatrist determined that respondent's prognosis is good,
but did not go as far as to assert that she is now fit to re-commence the practice of law.
The Departmental Disciplinary Committee now moves for an order suspending respondent from the practice of
law on the ground that she suffers from a "disability by reason of physical or mental infirmity or illness" (22 NY-
CRR 603.16[c][1] ). In her cross motion respondent seeks to convert the current suspension to a medical suspension
nunc pro tunc, but further seeks an order vacating the suspension and reinstating her to the practice of law, due to
her year-long sobriety.
The Committee's motion, and the first branch of respondent's cross motion, are granted to the extent that the
prior finding of non-cooperation is vacated and an order **189 of suspension based upon the attorney's medical dis-
ability is granted nunc pro tunc (see Matter of Kaplan, 65 A.D.3d 287, 883 N.Y.S.2d 182 [2009]; Matter of Fusco,
18 A.D.3d 81, 798 N.Y.S.2d 364 [2005] ).
[1][2] However, that branch of respondent's cross motion seeking immediate reinstatement is denied at this
time. The cross motion itself concedes the existence of the alcohol dependence rendering her unfit to practice law;
additionally, she acknowledged during her deposition that her failure to cooperate and *170 her underlying conduct
was related to alcohol dependency. To support her cross motion, respondent implies that the examining psychiatrist
failed to satisfy an obligation to establish that she continues to be unfit to resume her practice. However, to be enti-
tled to reinstatement, since the initial infirmity has been conceded, it is respondent who must prove her fitness to be
reinstated (see 22 NYCRR 603.16[f] ), and that burden is not satisfied here by her own self-assessment (see Matter
of Stewart, 47 A.D.3d 43, 846 N.Y.S.2d 13 [2007] ). The branch of respondent's cross motion seeking reinstatement
to the practice of law therefore must be denied at this time, without prejudice to a further application, supported by
an evaluation by a mental health provider attesting to her current fitness to re-commence the practice of law (see
Matter of Supino, 23 A.D.3d 11, 14, 806 N.Y.S.2d 178 [2005] ).
Accordingly, the Committee's motion and respondent's cross motion should be granted to the extent that the pri-
or order's finding of non-cooperation is vacated, and respondent is suspended from the practice of law for an indefi-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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DOJ-OGR-00010124

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