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1.07 MB

Extraction Summary

7
People
4
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Opr (office of professional responsibility) report / legal filing
File Size: 1.07 MB
Summary

This page from an OPR report critiques the USAO's handling of the Epstein Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), specifically regarding the failure to seize Epstein's computers. It details how prosecutors Sloman and Villafaña postponed litigation to obtain the computers, and how US Attorney Acosta signed the NPA—which effectively ended the pursuit of this critical evidence—despite likely being aware of the ongoing efforts to obtain it. The report argues the USAO gave away significant leverage and potential evidence of crimes without proper consideration.

People (7)

Name Role Context
Jeffrey Epstein Defendant/Subject
Subject of federal investigation; defense attorneys negotiated the NPA; did not want contents of his computers disclo...
Alexander Acosta US Attorney (Former)
Reviewed and approved the NPA; was aware of efforts to obtain Epstein's computers; relied on counsel of Sloman and Me...
Sloman Prosecutor/USAO Official
Interviewed by OPR; vaguely remembered computer issue; instructed Villafaña to postpone a hearing.
Villafaña Prosecutor/USAO Official
Knew where computers were; consulted subject matter experts; asked Sloman about postponing the Sept 12, 2007 hearing.
Menchel USAO Official/Advisor
Consulted by Acosta regarding the case.
Lourie USAO Official (Implied)
Suggested in interview response that the court might have precluded production of computers.
FBI co-case agent Investigator
Proposed waiting until litigation was resolved before pursuing plea negotiations.

Timeline (2 events)

09/12/2007
Scheduled hearing on the litigation regarding Epstein's computers (postponed).
Court
Unknown (2007/2008)
Signing of the NPA (Non-Prosecution Agreement).
Unknown
Acosta Epstein defense team

Relationships (3)

Alexander Acosta Professional/Supervisory Sloman
Acosta told OPR that he worked closely with Sloman and Menchel, consulted with them, and relied on their counsel.
Alexander Acosta Professional/Supervisory Menchel
Acosta told OPR that he worked closely with Sloman and Menchel, consulted with them, and relied on their counsel.
Villafaña Professional/Colleague Sloman
Villafaña asked Sloman whether to put off a hearing; Sloman instructed her to do so.

Key Quotes (4)

"The NPA itself provides that 'the federal . . . investigation will be suspended, and all pending [legal process] will be held in abeyance,' that Epstein will withdraw his 'motion to intervene and to quash certain [legal process]'"
Source
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Quote #1
"Villafaña knew where the computers were; litigation over the demand for the equipment was already underway; there was good reason to believe the computers contained relevant—and potentially critical—information"
Source
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Quote #2
"The USAO ultimately agreed to a term in the NPA that permanently ended the government’s ability to obtain possible evidence of significant crimes and did so with apparently little serious consideration of the potential cost."
Source
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Quote #3
"Acosta’s numerous edits on the NPA’s final draft suggest that he gave it a close read"
Source
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Quote #4

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (4,197 characters)

Case 22-1426, Document 77, 06/29/2023, 3536038, Page206 of 258
SA-204
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 204 of 348
with one of Epstein’s defense attorneys about it. Sloman told OPR during his interview that he “vaguely” remembered the computer issue. The documentary evidence confirms that he had at least some contemporaneous knowledge of the issue—when asked by Villafaña whether to put off a September 12, 2007 hearing on the litigation, he told her to do so. Finally, as noted previously, the FBI co-case agent proposed at a meeting with USAO personnel that the USAO wait until the litigation was resolved before pursuing plea negotiations.
Contemporaneous records show that Acosta was likely aware before the NPA was signed of the USAO’s efforts to obtain custody of Epstein’s computers and that after the NPA was signed, he was informed about the use of legal process for obtaining the computer equipment. The NPA itself provides that “the federal . . . investigation will be suspended, and all pending [legal process] will be held in abeyance,” that Epstein will withdraw his “motion to intervene and to quash certain [legal process],” and, further, that the parties would “maintain . . . evidence subject to [legal process] that have been issued, and including certain computer equipment, inviolate” until the NPA’s terms had been fully satisfied, at which point the legal process would be “deemed withdrawn.” (Emphasis added.) Acosta’s numerous edits on the NPA’s final draft suggest that he gave it a close read, and OPR expects that Acosta would not have approved the agreement without understanding what legal process his office was agreeing to withdraw, or why the only type of evidence specified was “certain computer equipment.” In addition, Acosta told OPR that he worked closely with Sloman and Menchel, consulted with them, and relied on their counsel about the case. Among other things, Acosta said he discussed with them concerns about the law and the evidentiary issues presented by a federal criminal trial. Therefore, although it is possible that Sloman made the decision to postpone the hearing concerning the USAO’s efforts to obtain the computer equipment without consulting Acosta, once Acosta reviewed the draft NPA, Acosta was on notice of the existence of and the ongoing litigation concerning Epstein’s missing computer equipment.
Villafaña knew where the computers were; litigation over the demand for the equipment was already underway; there was good reason to believe the computers contained relevant—and potentially critical—information; and it was clear Epstein did not want the contents of his computers disclosed. Nothing in the available record reveals that the USAO benefitted from abandoning pursuit of this evidence when they did, or that there was any significant consideration of the costs and benefits of forgoing the litigation to obtain production of the computers.254 Instead, the USAO agreed to postpone and ultimately to abandon its efforts to obtain evidence that could have significantly changed Acosta’s decision to resolve the federal investigation with a state guilty plea or led to additional significant federal charges. By agreeing to postpone the litigation, the USAO gave away leverage that might have caused the defense to come to an agreement much earlier and on terms more favorable to the government. The USAO ultimately agreed to a term in the NPA that permanently ended the government’s ability to obtain possible evidence of significant crimes and did so with apparently little serious consideration of the potential cost.
254 If the USAO had significant concerns about its likelihood of prevailing, postponing the litigation to use it as leverage in the negotiations might have been strategically reasonable. Lourie suggested in his response to his interview transcript that the court might have precluded production of the computers. However, OPR saw no evidence indicating that Villafaña or her supervisors were concerned that the court would do so, and Villafaña had consulted with the Department’s subject matter experts before initiating her action to obtain the equipment.
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